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In 2003, Tanzania enacted the new Fair Competition Act which aimed at improving 
competition in the market. The Fair Competition Act, No 8 of 2003 (FCA) regulates 
agreements which lessen or weaken competition, cartel conduct, abuse of dominant position, 
and it also controls the merging of firms. The Act established two regulatory bodies, namely 
the Fair Competition Commission (FCC) and the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT). It vested 
the FCC with multiple powers (investigation, prosecution and adjudication) and the FCT with 
a final appellate jurisdiction. While concentration of power in the FCC may be cost-saving to 
government, it is associated with problems on the side of stakeholders particularly on the 
question of impartiality, since the FCC is likely to be a judge of its own cause. Likewise, the 
Constitution of Tanzania provides that the judiciary be the final appellate body in 
administration of justice, but the FCA vested this power in the quasi-judicial body. 
The dissertation criticises the powers of the FCC and FCT. It comprises five chapters. 
Chapter one introduces the dissertation by giving the background of competition law in 
Tanzania, the statement of the problem, research questions, reason for selection of the topic 
and research methodology. 
Chapter two covers the conceptual framework of anti-competitive practices. It aims to 
outline to the reader what amounts to anti-competitive practices as provided by examples of 
competition law and policies of Tanzania and other jurisdictions, and the challenges of 
distinguishing acts that lessen competition from acts that favour competition and the welfare 
of consumers. It questions whether enforcement bodies established under the FCA are 
adequate to ensure justice in settling competition disputes.  
Chapter three focuses on the institutional framework and procedures set up by the 
FCA. It further examines the approach of the courts, both local and foreign, to the challenges 
of fair trial in competition disputes. The core discussion is on the partiality of the FCC, right 
of appeal to ordinary courts and the inadequacy of the remedies available for a party 
aggrieved by the decision of the FCT. 
Chapter four makes a comparative study between South African competition law and 
Tanzanian competition law. The purpose is to find out whether it is possible to separate 
investigative functions from adjudicative functions and vest such functions in different 
bodies, and whether the decisions of specialised enforcement bodies may be appealed in 
vi 
 
normal courts of law. The target is to strike a balance between the enforcement of competition 
law and policy while respecting the principles of natural justice (right to be heard).  
Chapter five concludes the dissertation and offers solutions to the drawbacks inherent 
in the FCA in order to enhance fair access to justice. It recommends that the provisions of the 
FCA that concentrate too much power in the FCC and introduced finality clauses to the 
decisions of the FCT should be redrawn to be in line with international and regional 
instruments and the Constitution regarding a fair trial and the right of unlimited appeal. The 
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Business needs to be regulated to enhance fairness in a market; therefore there is a need to 
have a law to control it. The development of industries depends on the law and policy of a 
specific country. The market may be monopolised by a few individuals, by powerful 
companies or by the State. In a modern and globalising economy, monopolisation of the 
market is generally not accepted. However, competition law prohibits abuse of monopoly 
power and not monopoly per se.
1
  
Most of the competition legislation in developing countries including Tanzania 
originated from developed countries; however, certain modifications are necessary to suit the 
needs of a particular jurisdiction. Tanzania has enacted competition law to promote a market 
economy and to protect the welfare of the consumers. Further, it establishes the regulatory 
bodies to enforce the law which are, in Tanzania the Fair Competition Commission and the 
Fair Competition Tribunal. 
This dissertation makes a critical analysis of the investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication powers of the Fair Competition Commission and the final appellate jurisdiction 
of the Fair Competition Tribunal, so as to identify weaknesses in the Fair Competition Act of 
Tanzania. 
1.2 Background of Competition law and policy in Tanzania 
This section is important to the dissertation for it set out the origin and development of the 
current competition law and policy in Tanzania. 
During colonisation by the British, the economy in Tanzania was monopolised by the 
private sector. The target of the economy was to collect raw materials to be exported to 
Europe. The indigenous people could only participate in the economic sector by producing 
raw materials for the colonialists. 
After independence, Tanzania adopted a socialist policy. This culminated in a change 
from a capitalist to a socialist economic policy whose aim was to bring power and wealth to 
                                                             





 The state expropriated the major means of production and became a 
monopoly in the industrial sector,
3
 (it became the buyer, distributor and seller of agricultural 
produce). Tanzania was a socialist country between 1967 and 1986.
4
  
The state monopoly had a great impact on the economy of the country in that it 
hindered competition and caused lack of innovation. In the 1970s and 80s Tanzania 
underwent an economic crisis. The local industries failed to meet the internal demands. This 
was as a result of ‘limited internal capacity, series of oil price increases, inadequate resource 
mobilization and inefficient allocation of resources’.
5
 
1.2.1 Genesis of Competition law in Tanzania 
In 1985, Tanzania changed her economic and political policies and legal structures, 
particularly in the areas of competition rules and principles. In 1986, it underwent tremendous 
economic changes by embracing the global liberal economy, and a new policy was put in 
place that encouraged competition in the market. This policy invited private sector investment 
through the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act No 10 of 1990 which 
established the Investment Promotion Centre, and this was later replaced by the current 
Tanzania Investment Centre.
6
 Public institutions were commercialised to meet the 
competition in the market. For example, national distribution agencies such as National 
Milling Corporation and Regional Trading Company were privatised.
7
  
The liberal economy necessitated the creation of regulatory bodies for the purpose of 
implementing regulatory reforms to control the market economy. This pressure resulted in the 
repeal of the Regulation of Price Act No 19 of 1973 in 1993, whose Price Commission was 
responsible for setting prices of commodities in order to manage inflation.
8
 
                                                             
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development report, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition law and 
policy: A Tripartite Report on the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (2012) at 37, available 
at, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcclp2012d1_Comparative_Report_en.pdf, [accesed on 15 
August  2012]. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Musonda Flora, Competition Regimes in the World-A Civil Society Report at 288, available at, 
  http://competitionregimes.com/pdf/Book/Africa/56-Tanzania.pdf, [accessed on 19 August 2012].  
5 UNCTAD report (note 2) at 38.  
6 See s 4 of the Tanzania Investment Act No 26 of 1997; s 30 of this Act repealed the former Act No 10 of 1990. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Joseph S & Rugumisa SMH, ‘Price Control in the Management of an Economic Crisis: The National Price 
Commission in Tanzania,’ (1988) 31, No. 1 African Studies Review, at 47-65.  
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In 1994, Tanzania enacted the Fair Trade Practice Act No 4 of 1994 which in 2002 
was renamed the Fair Competition Act, [Cap 285 R.E 2002].
9
 It aimed at enhancing 
competition in the market through regulating monopolies, prohibiting restrictive trade 
practices and protecting the consumer. Despite the review of Act No 4 of 1994 in 2002, it 
lasted for a short time due to its weaknesses as witnessed by the UNCTAD report which 
states that: 
The Act did not achieve much, speculatively because it was accepted without 
understanding as part of the IMF SAPs and did not have a national champion to 
promote and promulgate it. The Commission itself was not well resourced and 




In April 2003, the Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 (FCA) was passed. It was 
assented to by the President on 23
rd 
May 2003 and took effect on 12
th
 May 2004, [according 
to GN No 150 of 2004]. This Act repealed and replaced Act No 4 of 1994.
11
 The FCA 
contained provisions regulating prohibited agreements, cartel conduct, abuse of dominant 
positions and merger control.
12
 
The aim of the FCA is to ‘promote and protect effective competition in trade and 
commerce and to protect consumers from unfair and misleading market conduct’.
13
 It 
promotes competition in the market, to protect consumers and not the competitors.
14
 It further 
establishes the institutions responsible for the enforcement of its objectives, namely the Fair 
Competition Commission (FCC) and the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT).
15
 
1.3 Objective and Statement of the problem 
This dissertation is a critique of powers vested in the Tanzanian enforcement bodies viz. the 
FCC and FCT by the FCA in respect of the right to be heard. It specifically focuses on the 
provisions of the FCA which concentrated investigation and adjudication powers in the hands 
of the FCC. These provisions attract criticism particularly on the question of impartiality of 
the FCC. It further focuses on the provision of the FCA that vested the final appellate 
                                                             
9 In Tanzania, the laws revised in 2002 are cited by indicating the chapter of the law ended with abbreviation 
R.E 2002.  
10 UNCTAD report (note 2) at 40. 
11
 S 102 of the Fair Competition Act, No 8 of 2003. 
12 Ss 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the FCA. 
13 The long title of the FCA. 
14 See Brunswick Corp. v Pucblo Browl-O-Mat, Inc 429 US 477,488 (1977), quoting Brown Shoe Co. v United 
States, 370 US 294,320 (1964). 
15 Ss 62 and 83 respectively. 
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jurisdiction in the FCT. It limits access to the right of appeal as enshrined in international and 
regional instruments and the Constitution.
16
  
The principles of natural justice give an individual the right to a fair hearing by an 
impartial decision-maker, where contravention is alleged. They include the right to access 
justice as well as the right to appeal to the final appellate court established by the constitution. 
These principles are supported by the doctrine of separation of powers among the organs of 
the State to allow policing of the acts of each organ. The provisions of the FCA undermine 
the principles of natural justice by concentrating too much power to one body, (FCC: 
investigation, prosecution and adjudication). Furthermore, it deprives an individual of the 
right to appeal to a court of law yet gives appellate powers of dispute resolution to 
administrative bodies without involving the courts.
17
  
The FCA transplanted the powers vested in the European Competition Commission to 
the FCC which is problematic as it is ‘a law-maker, policeman, investigator, prosecutor and a 
judge’ as Jones and Sufrin
18
 put it. The FCC has powers to investigate anti-competitive 
practices including the power to issue summons, search, initiate a complaint and adjudicate.
19
 
It is therefore a law maker for it is an agent of the government which is a policy-maker. It 
monitors breaches of the FCA by investigating anti-competitive conduct and when prima 
facie evidence is established, it initiates a complaint and adjudicates by itself.  
The constitutionality of multiple powers of the FCC was challenged in the local case 
of Tanzania Cigarette Company Ltd v The FCC and Attorney General;
20
 where the petitioner 
contended that ‘the exercise of FCC’s accusatory and adjudicative powers infringes its 
constitutional rights’. This contention is yet to be settled by the court as will be discussed in 
this paper. The FCC’s powers were again challenged in another local case of Tanzania 
Breweries Ltd v Serengeti Breweries Ltd and FCC.
21
 The appellant in this case appealed to 
                                                             
16 Articles 13 (6) (a) and 107 A of the Constitution of Tanzania [Cap 2 R.E 2002] provides for a right to be heard 
by impartial decision body and right to appeal to the highest judicial body. 
17 The Supreme Court of Tanzania was of the view that there is no right to appeal to the High Court where the 
statute did not provide for the specific provision for appeal from tribunal to ordinary court. See Athumani 
Kungubaye and 482 others v Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform commission and Tanzania 
Telecommunication, civil appeal No 56 of 2007 (Unreported) at 7.  In Tanzania the High Court has original 
jurisdiction on constitutional matters(basic rights provided by the constitution) and judicial review and the 
remedy available in both constitutional matters and judicial review is defferent from the remedy available on 
appeal as discussed in detail in this paper. 
18 Jones A. and Sufrin B, EU Competition Law Text, Cases and Materials 4 ed, (2011) at 1037. 
19 Ss 68-71 of the FCA. 
20 Misc. civil cause No.31 of 2010 (Unreported) at 7. 
21 Tribunal Appeal No 4 of 2010 at 3 (Ruling of PO). 
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the FCT on the grounds inter alia that the ‘FCC failed to act in accordance with principles of 
natural justice and procedural fairness’ which included the lack of impartiality. The matter is 
also yet to be settled by the FCT, and this study intends to respond to it. 
The FCA further established the FCT which is a final appellate body; it hears appeals 
from the FCC.
22
 The FCT is presided over by a chairman who is appointed by the President 
with other members and it has no deputy chairman. Its decision is final. The law provides that 




 This means that the decision of 
the FCT is conclusive and there is no opportunity to appeal to ordinary courts.
25
 The findings 
of the FCT are limited to revision, which is different from appeal, where the appellate body 
has power and opportunity to re-hear the matter in dispute and gives its own findings. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), to which Tanzania is a 
signatory,
26
 provides that ‘[e]very one is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights...’
27
 The 
declaration is read together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 1966
28
 which advocates for the same rights of equality before the court/tribunal and 
a fair hearing by a fair, impartial tribunal. At the regional level (Africa) the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter) emphasizes the right to appeal and to be 
heard before an impartial tribunal.
29
  
In Tanzania, the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal 
and the right to appeal.
30
 The above listed international, regional and local instruments 
indicate that an individual should not be barred from accessing justice, that is, the right to be 
heard by an impartial body and the right to appeal to the final body established by the 
                                                             
22 S 83 of the FCA. 
23 The word ‘shall’ means mandatory, see s 53 (2) of Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap 1 R.E 2002. 
24 S 84(1) of the FCA. 
25 Note 17. 
26 United Nations member states available at http://www.un.org/en/members, [accessed on 9 September 2012]. 
27 Article 10, 1948, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml, [accessed on 28 August 
2012].  
28 Article 14 (1), 1966. Tanzania ratified the ICCPR in June 1976. See United Republic of Tanzania Information 
and Broadcasting Policy at 2, available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/tanzania-
information-and-broadcasting-policy-f.pdf, [accessed on 2 August 2012]. 
29 Article 7(1) (a) and (d), 1981.Tanzania is a signatory to the charter from 31st of May 1983 and ratified it on 
18th February 1984. See List of  member countries, available at 
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and
%2Peoples%20Rights.pdf, [accessed on 11 July 2012].  





 The FCA is not in conformity with either international or local instrument 
since the FCC, which is an agent of the executive, is given power in such a way that the 
general principles of natural justice are infringed. Also, the final appelate jurisdiction of the 
FCT hinders the right to appeal to ordinary courts.  
The question, however, is whether the above laws are applicable to companies, since most 
of the parties in competition proceedings are corporate bodies? It is justifiable that the right to 
be heard by an impartial tribunal is a right applicable to both legal and natural persons. A 
legal entity ‘has all legal powers and capacity of an individual’.
32
 A company has ‘the legal 
capacity and powers of a natural person’.
33
 It is therefore established that a legal entity has 




This dissertation therefore argues that the investigation, prosecution and adjudication 
powers of the FCC are unconstitutional. It also argues that although there is a right to appeal 
from the FCC to the FCT, there is no statutory right to appeal to ordinary courts
35
; thus 
revision jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania is not intended to replace the right to 
appeal to ordinary courts. Chapter three of this dissertation provides the detailed discussion. 
1.4 Research questions 
The dissertation will argue the following: 
 Whether the FCC as established under FCA and vested with multiple functions is 
adequate to provide an impartial right to be heard. 
 Whether the FCT’s decision, which is final, breaches the constitutional right to appeal. 
 Whether a party aggrieved by the decision of the FCT has any alternative adequate 
remedy. 
                                                             
31 Ibid, article 107A provides that the judiciary shall be the final authority in dispensation of justice in both 
criminal and civil cases. 
32 Section 19 (1) (b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (SA). 
33 S 161 of Australian Corporations Law Act No 109 of 1989. 
34 Cassim FH ‘Corporate Capacity, Agency and the Turquand Rule’ in Cassim FH, Contemporary Company 
Law (2011) at 158. 
35 See note 17. 
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 Whether a study of the South African and Jamaican competition law36 and case law 
imparts any persuasive lessons relevant to the institutional framework for the 
enforcement of anti-competitive practices in Tanzania.  
 Whether the current enforcement structure of anti-competitive practices in Tanzania is 
harmonious with the right to a fair trial as enshrined in the International Convention 
on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
Constitution of Tanzania.  
1.5 Reasons for selection of the topic 
The reasons for selection of this topic are: first, the researcher is Tanzanian by nationality, 
hence conversant with the legal system of his country. Secondly, the researcher, with the 
knowledge acquired in the field of competition law in South Africa, identified the danger of 
likely partiality (being a judge of its own cause) in settlement of competition dispute on the 
part of the FCC with its multiple functions, as witnessed by challenges raised in TCC and 
TBL cases and barriers to access justice entertained by provisions of the FCA. Thirdly, the 
journey of Competition law that started in 1994 in Tanzania does not have an end in sight due 
to the fact that economic policies and competition law and policy keep changing and there is a 
need to conform to the emerging trends, which this research seeks to highlight.  
1.6 Research Methodology 
This is a desktop research. It is composed of analysis of international and regional 
instruments on the right to be heard by an impartial court/tribunal and the right of appeal to a 
court of law. It examines how the High Court of Tanzania dealt with the challenge of a right 
to a fair hearing in competition disputes. The study focuses on Tanzanian legislation 
including but not limited to the Constitution and the FCA, with the purpose of analysing in 
what ways the provisions of the FCA undermine the Constitution.  
The study makes reference to foreign legislations (Constitution and completion law) 
like the Jamaican legislations
37
 and the South African that underline the separation of 
                                                             
36
 Jamaican law is picked as reference because Jamaican competition law has similar provisions with Tanzanian 
competition law that empowered the Commission with multiple powers (investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication) but the supreme court of Jamaica has declared those provisions unconstitutional. Likewise the 
South African competition law is relevant because it separated investigation powers from adjudication powers 




investigative power from adjudicative power and the right to appeal to a court of law. The 
experiences from these jurisdictions reflect on the problem facing Tanzania.  A comparative 
study is made of South African competition law regime. This choice is relevant since the 
South African competition law adheres to general principles of natural justice in that it 
separated investigation, prosecution and adjudication powers and vested them in different 
adjudicatory bodies, and also provided for the avenue of appeal to ordinary courts. 
Reference is also made to cases that addressed the right to be heard by an impartial 
decision-making body, United Nations reports on competition law and policy, the work of 
prominent commentators, books, journals and other relevant materials. The reason for 
reference to foreign literatures is that Tanzania lacks extensive literature in the field of 
competition law and very few cases are decided and reported. 
















THE CONCEPT OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES  
2.1 Introduction 
The dissertation challenges the powers of the FCC and FCT in controlling prohibited 
agreements, cartel conduct, abuse of dominant position and control of mergers. It is therefore 
prudent and relevant to give a brief discussion on these anti-competitive practices before 
discussing the manner in which these regulatory bodies exercise their power. The role of 
regulatory bodies is to ensure that the competition process is conducted by all players in the 
market in a manner which is fair and reasonable in the interest of consumer welfare.
38
 
The chapter gives a brief overview of the anti-competitive practices covered by 
Tanzanian competition law. Reference is made to very few available local cases and extensive 
use of foreign materials is made to elaborate Tanzanian competition law. These anti-
competitive practices include anti-competitive agreements, agreements which are prohibited 
irrespective of their effect on competition, abuse of dominant position and merger control 
which are collectively known as restrictive trade practices in Tanzania.
39
 
2.2 Anti-competitive agreements 
The FCA prohibits agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition in the market.
40
 
The term ‘agreements’ as applied by the FCA, includes agreements between persons or a 
decision of a person whether incorporated or not.
41
 Section 8 of the FCA does not specify 
whether prohibited agreements are in horizontal or vertical relationship, it merely prohibits 
agreements between persons, and the word person as defined in the FCA means natural or 
legal person. Sutherland and Kemp
42
 admit that there are jurisdictions in which competition 
legislation does not draw a clear distinction between horizontal and vertical restrictions. The 
EU and the USA competition legislation are cited as examples, and Tanzania falls under those 
categories of legislation. The FCA of Tanzania provides only that agreements have to be dealt 
                                                             
38 Paulis Emil ‘Abuse of dominant position and monopolization: Conclusions of the major debates in the EU and 
USA’ in Mateus AM and Moreira T (eds) Competition Law and Economics (2010), at 162. 
39
  In South Africa prohibited merger does not fall under restrictive trade practices, see chapter 2 and 3 of Act No 
89 of 1998 (SA Act). 
40 S 8 (1) of the FCA. 
41 Ibid s 2.  
42 Sutherland P and Kemp K, Competition Law of South Africa at 5-8. 
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with base on ‘rule of reason’ (section 8) and those agreements which fall under ‘per se 
prohibition’ (section 9).  
The South African competition law makes a distinction between prohibited practices 
and restrictive practices.
43
 The Act is interpreted to distinguish between offences that arise out 
of the unilateral action of a dominant entity and those offences where one person commits 
with association with another person.
44
 A restrictive practice concerns anti-competitive co-
operation (vertical and horizontal restrictive practice) whereas prohibited practice (prohibition 
of abuse of dominance) is aimed at unilateral anti-competitive conduct.
45
  
Whether the competition legislation made a clear distinction between horizontal and 
vertical restrictive practices or not, in practice agreements may be made by parties who are in 
horizontal relationship or vertical relationship, as discussed below. 
2.2.1 Horizontal agreements   
Horizontal agreements are agreements between competitors who are in a horizontal 
relationship and operate in the same market.
46
 It is a challenge to determine whether parties 





 gives the example that three entities might be trading in the same market of 
pharmaceutical goods: one manufactures and supplies anti-cancer drugs, another makes drugs 
that relieve ulcer pain and a third makes anti-depressant drugs; but these manufacturers do not 
necessarily qualify as competitors. 
Section 9(1) of the FCA provides that, a person shall not make or give effect to an 
agreement if the object, effect or likely effect of the agreement is: 
a) price fixing between competitors 
b)  a collective boycott by competitors or 
c) Collusive bidding or tendering 
                                                             
43 See ss 4, 5 and 8 of SA Act. 
44 Ibid s 1, it provides that restrictive horizontal practices means any practices listed in section 4 and restrictive 
vertical practices means any practices listed in section 5. 
45 Competition Commission v Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd and 3 others, 08/CR/Mar01 
at para 22. See also Sutherland (note 42) at 5-3. 
46 S 1(1) of SA Act. 
47 See Campbell J, ‘Restrictive Horizontal Practices’ in Brassey M (ed) Competition law 8 ed (2010), at 139. 
48 Brassey (note 47) at 159. 
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This provision is construed to be ‘per se prohibition’ in the sense that such conduct is 
prohibited per se irrespective of its effect on competition. The logic behind ‘per se 
prohibition’ is to ensure efficient utilization of limited resources. It is not seen as necessary to 
apply ‘rule of reasons’ on restrictions which cannot be justified.
49
 The provision may also be 
construed to fall under horizontal restrictive practices since it prohibits agreements between 
competitors. 
In horizontal restrictive practices competitive firms may act like a monopoly, the 
competitors co-operating rather than competing.
50
 The South African Corporate Leniency 
Policy assumes that cartels are harmful to consumers and hinder development and 
innovation.
51
 The co-operation of competitors gives rise to the danger that, ‘they may co-
ordinate to produce the monopoly output at the monopoly price…receive monopoly profit at a 
cost to consumers of higher price and a lower output’.
52
  
To establish that price fixing has taken place, a complainant needs to establish that 
such an agreement to price fix, or contract or conspiracy relating to price exists.
53
  In fact, it is 
not easy to establish price collusion because an arrangement of this nature is done secretly.
54
 
Price fixing arrangements are serious wrongs in competition and strictly prohibited ‘because 
of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy’.
55
 Price fixing 
is ‘inimical to economic competition, and has no place in a sound economy’.
56
 
In collusive bidding or tendering, parties to the agreement try to tamper with the entire 
process of tendering by fixing or controlling the prices and agree that one of them will win 
the bid by submitting a bid with acceptable terms.
57
 Its effect is that it lessens or prevents 
competitive bidding. 
                                                             
49 Sutherland (note 42) at 5-35. 
50 Ibid at 5-3. 
51 See para 2.3. 
52 Sutherland (note 42) at 5-4. 
53 Neale AD and Goyder DG, The Anti-trust law of USA 3 ed (1980) at 43.  
54 Jones (note 18) at 805.  
55 Unites States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150 (1940) at n 59, available at 
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/310/150/case.html, [accessed on 5 November 2012]. 
56 The Competition Commission v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd, at para 28, quoting the wording of Supreme Court in 
American Natural Soda Ash Corp v Competition Commission [2005] 1 CPLR 1(SCA). 
57 The parties do not compete by ‘submitting their lowest possible tender at tightest possible margin, they agree 
on the lowest offer to be submitted or agree amongst themselves who shall be the most successful bidder’. See 
Jones (note 18) at 812. 
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How to establish ‘collusive tendering’? Should deceit be established? In  SA Metal & 
Machinery Co Ltd v Cape Town Iron & Steel Works (Pty) Ltd and others
58
  it was argued that 
in order to prove collusive tendering it suffices to establish that the parties ‘acted jointly or in 
concert and that no element of deception, fraud or secrecy is required’. I am of the opinion 
that deceit and secrecy are crucial ingredients of collusive tendering. The word ‘collusion’ is 





 rightly argued that the enforcement bodies are obliged to 
establish the elements of deceit and secrecy before holding a party liable for collusive 
tendering.  
Section 4(1) of South African competition law provides for both ‘per se prohibition’ 
and ‘rule of reason prohibition’.
61
 In American Soda Ash Corporation and another v 
Competition Commission and two others,
62
 the appellants (American Soda Ash Corporation 
and CHC Global (Pty) Ltd) appealed against part of the decision of the competition tribunal 
based on the interpretation of section 4 (1) (b) of Act No 89 of 1998. The argument was that 
the per se prohibition may be rebutted by adducing evidence that shows that the alleged 
conducts may result in efficiencies and increase effective competition. It was settled that 
section 4 (1) (a) is distinguishable from section 4 (1) (b). Subsection 1 (a) allows the defence 
of efficiency, whereas in subsection 1 (b) ‘parties to agreement cannot produce evidence of 
pro-competitive gains that outweigh the demonstrated diminution of competition.
63
    
In Tanzania, although the cartel cases are yet to be handled by the competition 
authorities, the persuasive decision of the above case is relevant in interpreting section 9 of 
the FCA that provides for ‘per se prohibition’. The role of these authorities is to determine 
whether parties to the agreements are competitors, and this is done by determining the market 
at issue. They should also determine whether there were agreements, and if such agreements 
fall under per se prohibition provided under the FCA. The challenges that face the 
establishment of cartel cases in Tanzania are the requirement of the elements of ‘intention’ 
and ‘negligence’. Section 9 (4) of the FCA provides that. ‘[a]ny person who intentionally or 
negligently acts in contravention of the provision of this section, commits an offence….’ The 
                                                             
58 1997 (1) SA 319 (A) at 326E-F. 
59
 See free dictionary at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/collusion, [accessed on 21 November 2012]. 
60
 Brassey (note 47) at 143. 
61 Practices that are prohibited without proof of any anti-competitive consequences, and practices that are only 
prohibited once they are established to have a negative effect on competition. 
62 12/CAC/Dec01. 
63 Ibid, see paras 24-29 on the interpretation of s 4 (1) (b). 
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marginal notes of the section provide for the prohibition of agreements irrespective of their 
effect on competition. Surprisingly, subsection 4 looses this by changing the standard of 
proving cartels conduct, with the result that unintentional cartels are allowed. Competition 
law strictly prohibits cartels conduct.
64
  
Other agreements which do not fall under section 9 of the FCA receive the lenient 
approach of ‘rule of reason prohibition’ as discussed below. 
2.2.2 Vertical agreements 
Vertical agreements are agreements between the ‘competitor and its suppliers, customers or 
both;
65
 for example, ‘the manufacturer may gain or consolidate competitive strength by 
insisting that distributors deal exclusively in their products and no other’.
66
  Section 5 of Act 
No 89 of 1998 prohibits agreements between parties who are in vertical relationship if the 
effect of such agreement is to effect or substantially prevent or lessen competition in the 
market. This gives the lenient interpretation that the agreement is only prohibited if it has 
negative effects on competition. 
Section 5 (2) of the same Act prohibits minimum resale price maintenance; however a 
recommendation of minimum price may be made but the reseller must be made aware that the 
minimum price is not binding (subsection 3). This presupposes that resale price may be 
justified, therefore it receive a narrow understanding and application. According to 
Sutherland
67
‘[c]ompetition authorities should only accept that there is resale price 
maintenance if the seller has clearly established prices at which it obliges distributors to sell 
the  resold products’. The Tanzanian legislation does not mention resale price maintenance. 
In Tanzania, section 8 (1) of the FCA pre-supposes the rule of reason prohibition. It 
provides that, ‘[a] person shall not make or give effect to an agreement if the object, effect or 
likely effect of the agreement is to appreciably prevent, restrict or distort competition’. The 
FCC in Serengeti Breweries Ltd v Tanzania Breweries Ltd 
68
 addressed inter alia the issue as 
to whether the respondent’s entry into branding agreements with retail outlet owners 
                                                             
64 S 9 of the FCA and s 4 (1) (b) of SA Act. See also para 20 in the case of The Competition Commission of 
South Africa v Gralio (Pty) Ltd, 107/CAC/Dec 10.  
65  S 1 (1) of SA Act.  
66 Neale (note 53) at 249. 
67 Sutherland (note 42) at 6-54. 
68 Complaint No 2 of 2009. 
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amounted to anti-competitive practices.
69
 The complainant (Serengeti Breweries Limited 
(SBL)) requested the FCC to investigate unfair trade practices conducted by the respondent 
(Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL)) against it.  
It was alleged that the respondent was entering into branding agreements with bar 
owners which excluded the complainant in the market. The respondent argued that making 
branding agreements was a social obligation to clean bars and not anti-competitive practices. 
The FCC held that ‘it is clear that the branding agreements whether in writing or oral, which 
the respondent (TBL) has entered into with bar owners had the object, the effect or likely 
effect of preventing, restricting and distorting competition in the Tanzania beer market. The 
agreements amount to exclusive dealing;
70
 the agreements in this case are restrictive vertical 
practices since they are agreements between parties who are in a vertical relationship (TBL 
with its suppliers/customer). 
The lenient provisions of competition legislation allow competition authorities to be 
guided by ‘rule of reason’ to distinguish between anti-competitive practices (practices that 
lessen or prevent competition) from pro-competitive practices (practices that significantly 
favour competition and the welfare of consumers). Certain conducts may be justified by a 
defence of ‘any technological, efficiency or any other pro-competitive gain’.
71
  
2.3 Abuse of dominant position 
In competition law, what amounts to anti-competitive practice is the abuse of market power 
and not the possession of power.
72
 The enforcement authority must determine the dominance 
of an entity before dealing with the issue of abuse of a dominant position.
73
 Dominant power 
or monopoly power according to USA and SA definition is ‘the power to control prices or to 
exclude competition’.
74




                                                             
69 Ibid part 2.2.3. 
70 Ibid at 48.  
71 S 4 (1) (a) of SA Act. 
72
 ‘The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon if he wins.’ See Pupkin 
BA and Mcphie IR, ‘Dealing with Dominance: United States of America’ in Dutilh N, (ed) Dealing with 
Dominance, The Experience of National Competition authorities (2004), at 286. 
73 S 10(1) of the FCA. 
74 Pupkin (note 72) at 294. 
75 Ss 7 of the SA Act and 5(6) of the FCA. 
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Section 10(1) of the FCA provides that, ‘[a] person with dominant position in a market 
shall not use his position of dominance if the object, effect or likely effect of the conduct is to 
appreciably prevent, restrict or distort competition’. The provision however does not provide 
examples of conduct that amount to abuse of dominant position. The FCC in Serengeti’s 
case
76
 applied foreign sources to interpret this provision and stated that ‘misuse of dominance 
position includes practices like excessive pricing, price discrimination, refusal to supply, 
tying practices, price predation, exclusive conducts and other barriers to market entry’. The 
South African competition law
77
 outlines that charging an excessive price to the detriment of 
consumers, refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility, or engaging in an 
unjustifiable exclusionary act amount to abuse of dominant position. 
The question is, when a price is said to be excessive? Should the competition 
authorities be price regulators? The term ‘excessive price’ is not provided by the FCA. 
Section 1 of Act No 89 of 1998 defines excessive price to mean a price for goods or services 
which bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of those goods or services. In fact, 
in determining whether the dominant firm charged an excessive price, the competition 
authorities are not called upon to set and regulate price.
78
 They are duty bound to determine 
whether the price is excessive and whether it is to the detriment of consumers. The 
Competition Appeal Court of South Africa (CAC) set up the formula to determine the above 
issues. The competition authorities have to determine the actual price of the goods or services 
in question which is alleged to be excessive. They should also determine the economic value 
of the goods or services expressed in monetary value. Furthermore, the question as to whether 
the actual price is higher than the economic value of those goods or services has to be 
determined. Lastly, the competition authorities should be in a position to determine whether 
the charging of an excessive price is to the detriment of consumers.
79
  
Not all conduct is anti-competitive; some conduct is both ‘anti-competitive and pro-
competitive;
80
 for example tying or bundling products. Predation action may be looked at as 
pro-competitive: it is to the consumers’ advantage if they acquire goods or services for a 
                                                             
76 Serengeti (note 68) at 29. 
77 S 8 of SA Act. 
78 Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd and others v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd and others 70/CAC/Apr07 at 47. 
79 Ibid para 32. 
80 Paulis (note 38) at 161.  
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cheap price. What happens after the exclusion of the weak competitors? The predation 
conduct becomes anti-competitive practice during ‘recoupment’ by a dominant competitor.
81
 
Tying and bundling invite a debate between commentators as to whether they result in 
anti-competitive or pro-competitive practices. According to Evans and Salinger, tying and 
bundling amount to anti-competitive practice.
82
 The economists argue that both tying and 
bundling ‘are so common in competitive markets that it must provide efficiency’.
83
 It is also 
argued that efficiency may be achieved without bundling or tying.
84
 It is the duty of 
enforcement bodies to analyse such practices and to determine whether they prevent or lessen 
competition, otherwise they may be thwarting competition instead of promoting it. 
The questions of essential facility and exclusive conduct were addressed in the case of 
the Competition Commission v Telkom SA Ltd,
85
 where the respondent (Telkom) was sued 
inter alia for refusing to supply essential facilities to competitors and conducting exclusive 
practices by inducing customers/suppliers not to deal with competitors. In this case it was 
alleged that the dominant firm (Telkom) conducted itself in such a manner that it abused its 
monopoly position in the telecommunication market. It refused to supply essential facilities to 
its competitors (independent Value Added Network Service (VANS)).
86
 It was further alleged 
that the respondent induced their customers not to deal with competitors and charged 
excessive prices to the customers of the competitors.
87
 In general the respondent’s conduct 
was alleged to cause harm to both competitors and consumers and impede competition and 
innovation in the dynamic VANS market. The tribunal was satisfied that the respondent 
refused to supply essential facilities to the competitors and induced customers not to deal with 
a competitor,
88




                                                             
81 Ibid  at 163. 
82 Evans DS and Salinger M, ‘Why do firms bundle and tie? Evidence from competitive markets and 
implications for tying law (2005) 22 Yale Journal on Regulation 37 at 48 and 49, available  
   http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/heating/single firm/comments/219224 d.htm, [15 December 2012].  
83 Kuhn at el ‘Economic theories of bundling and their policy implementations in abuse cases: an assessment in 
the light of Microsoft case’ (2005) 1 European Competition journal at 106-107 quoted in Schmidt at 11. 
84
 Schmidt (note 83) at 11. 
85 11/CR/Feb04. 
86 Telkom (note 85) at 30. 
87 Ibid at 98 and 119. 
88 Ibid at 159. 
89 Ibid para 196. 
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2.4 Merger control 
According to section 12 of Act No 89 of 1998, ‘a merger occurs when one or more firms 
directly or indirectly acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of 
the business of another firm’. A merger may also be an agreement between two or more 
companies whereby their ‘assets and liabilities are pooled in a single company’.
90
 Parties may 
agree to dissolve the existing companies and form one new company, or dissolve one of the 
companies, which is then fused into the surviving one. Assets and liabilities of constituent 
companies become assets and liabilities of the newly formed company or the surviving 
company.
91
   
If a merger is a good thing for companies and for the growth of the economy, why 
should competition law and policy be concerned? According to Legh, ‘the easiest way for a 
firm to establish or enhance market power is by acquiring or merging with other firms’.
92
 The 
FCA provides that, ‘a merger is prohibited if it creates or strengthens a position of dominance 
in a market’.
93
 The FCA seems to be more sensitive to the creation of dominance than the 
effect of dominance itself.
94
 In South Africa, the determination of the merger is guided by the 
question whether the proposed merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen 
competition.
95
 The question that is entertained by the provision of section 11 of FCA is 
whether the creation of dominance per se may harm competition. The merge guideline 
(Tanzania) which is read together with provisions of the FCA concerning mergers provides 
that the FCC prohibits a merger proposal if it harms competition.
96
 Monitoring of a merger 
not only concerns the creation of dominance in a market but also the likelihood of preventing 
or lessening competition. The concern of competition law on the question of mergers is to 
strike the balance between anti-competitive effects and pro-competitive gains. The FCC 
approves mergers based on the ‘efficiency test’ which includes but is not limited to likely 
production of better and higher quality output, economic development and innovation. 
Mergers which are likely to cause harm to competition, consumers and the economy in 
                                                             
90 Cassim MF and Yeats J ‘Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and offers’ in Cassim (note 34) at 618. 
91 S 116 (7) (note 32). 
92 Legh R, Mergers and Merger control in Brassey (note 47) at 224.  
93
 S 11 (1).  
94 It is based on the ‘dominance’ test (law of European Union) rather than the SLC (Substantially Lessen 
Competition) test –the law of the United States. See Wood DP ‘International Harmonization of anti-trust Law: 
The Tortoise or the Hare’ (2002)3 Chicago Journal of International law 391 at 396. 
95 S12A (1) of the SA Act, see determinant factors in subsection 2. 
96 See para 4.3.2 of the FCC merger guidelines-Tanzania. 
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general such as price increases, the removal of adequate alternative supplies or making 
excessive profit cannot be approved by competition authorities.
97
 
Merger control enables the competition authorities to decide which businesses may be 
fused together.
98
 Not all merger proposals are notifiable. In Tanzania only merger proposals 
that involve a turnover or assets above the threshold are notifiable. The current threshold is 
TZS 800,000,000.
99
 In South Africa, small mergers are notifiable on request of the 
Commission or option of the party,
100
 while intermediate and large mergers must be notified 
to the Commission.
101
 These laws therefore impose a duty to merging firms to refer their 
notifiable merger proposal to the competition authorities for approval or disapproval.  
The notable prerequisite elements provided by the FCA for establishment of anti-
competitive conduct are ‘intention’ or ‘negligence’. Any agreement, whether based on ‘per se 
prohibition’, or ‘rule of reason prohibition’, or unilateral abuse of dominant position, or 
implementation of notifiable merger without approval by the FCC, is founded on statutory 
prerequisite elements of intention or negligence. Sections 8 (7), 9 (4), 10 (4) and 11 (6) of the 
FCA provides that, ‘[a]ny person who intentionally or negligently acts in contravention of the 
provisions of this section, commits an offence, under this Act’. The critical example of 
difficulties of complying with this statutory prerequisite condition may be seen in cartel cases. 
These are per se cases; justification is not needed either by establishing negligence or 
intention of the doer. Other examples are in abuse of dominance. According to Sutherland
102
 
‘intention is not a prerequisite for abuse of dominance. The complainant need not prove that 
the dominant firm aimed to misuse its market power or to create anti-competitive effect’. The 
FCC itself faces problems in relation to this statutory requirement. In the Serengeti case
103
 the 
dominant firm (TBL) directed its outlet owners to remove table cloths supplied by the 
competitors (SBL) in their bars in order to get an opportunity to utilise 14 crates of beer as 
buyer motivation. The FCC stated that the conduct had the effect of harming competition 
even if the dominant firm (TBL) had no intention of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition. The UNCTAD report posed a question as to whether under the FCA a person 
who unintentionally engages in anti-competitive conduct would not be found to have violated 
                                                             
97 Ibid para 4.2.3 (e) and (f). 
98
 Jones (note 18) at 855. 
99 Para 4.1 (note 96). 
100 S 13 of SA Act. 
101 Ibid s 13A.  
102 Sutherland (note 42) at 7-35. 
103 Serengeti (Note 68) at 43. 
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the law? It also admitted that the FCC lacks guidelines on how to determine non-intentional 
and non-negligent acts.
104
 This observation call for legislative review of the above mentioned 
provisions of the FCA. 
2.5 Conclusion  
The FCA vests the FCC and FCT with powers to investigate and determine which practices 
amount to anti-competitive conduct and further gives them the powers to sanction such 
conduct. Anti-competitive practices are obstacles to competition and not acceptable in market 
policy. The question is whether these bodies can exercise these powers fairly if the FCC is an 
investigator, complainant and adjudicator and the FCT exercises the powers of appeal on 
decisions of the FCC, while its decision is not appealable to a court of law. This aspect is 














                                                             




THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION 
DISPUTES IN TANZANIA 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter analyses the institutions established by the FCA which are vested with the 
powers to deal with competition disputes. It focuses on their establishment, their composition, 
the procedure for investigation, prosecution and adjudication and appeal, and the status of the 
decision of each institution. The chapter further focuses on the likely risk of bias when one 
institution is left to handle multiple functions. It also deals with the limitation of the right to 
be heard when the FCT is vested with final appellate jurisdiction in competition matters. The 
basis of the critique arises from the challenge of constitutionality of the provisions of the FCA 
which had been raised from the very first cases handled by the FCC. 
Reference will be made to relevant foreign law (legislation and cases) taking into 
consideration the fact that Tanzania has about five years of experience in matters of 
competition law and thus lacks sufficient literature, cases and other relevant material in this 
field.  
3.2 The Fair Competition Commission (FCC) 
The FCC
105
 is mandated to enforce the FCA. It is headed by a chairman who is appointed by 
the president. The Director General (DG) and other members are appointed by the minister 
responsible for Trade Affairs.
106
 The tenure of the office of the chairman and DG is four years 




3.2.1 Investigative power of FCC  
The FCC has administrative, investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative authority.
108
 For the 
purpose of this discussion, investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are focused 
upon. In the course of investigation of an allegation either by its own motion or submitted by 
                                                             
105 Established under s 62 of the FCA.  
106 Ibid s 63 (3) and (4) and s 62 (7).  
107 Ibid s 63 (7). 
108 Ibid ss 63, 65, 69 and 73. 
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any person, the FCC has a judicial function to issue a summons
109
 to any person to appear 
before it and produce any information relevant to the investigation.  
A person who is summonsed is obliged to submit the information to the FCC. 
Alternatively a police officer holding a search warrant
110
 accompanied by a member of the 
FCC may enter and search the premises of that person and make copies or take extracts of 
documents therein.
111
 Non-compliance with the summons is an offence.
112
 The FCA compels 
a person to appear before the FCC and give any relevant information to it. S 71(4) of the FCA 
provides that ‘[a] person shall not be excused from complying with a summons under this 
section on the grounds that compliance may tend to incriminate the person or make the person 
liable to a penalty…’The UNCTAD report at page 59 provides that a person shall be excused 
if the information tends to incriminate him/her. This appears to be a misconception of the law 
because the real position of s 71(4) is as quoted above.  
The European Court of Justice in Solvay & Cie v Commission of the European 
Communities,
113
 was of the view that although the Commission is entitled to compel a person 
to give self-incriminating information, it should be noted that; ‘…the Commission may not 
compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which might involve an admission on its 
part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to 
prove’.
114
 This approach is relevant and may be adopted by the FCC for it is its duty to 
investigate and not compel admission from the investigated person. The approach taken in 
South Africa is that any person summonsed by the Commission for the purpose of 
investigation ‘is not obliged to answer any question if the answer is self-incriminating’.
115
 
However, in Tanzania, although self-incriminating evidence is relevant and admissible, it is 
noteworthy that such evidence is admissible only under the FCA.  
The FCC makes its own rules
116
 in order to carry out its functions. It further 
establishes divisions within itself for the purpose of properly carrying out its functions.
117
 
                                                             
109 Rule 13 (1) of the Fair Competition Commission Procedure Rules 2010 (FCCPR) and s.71 of the FCA.  
110 Rule16 of FCCPR. 
111 S71 (5) of the FCA.  
112 Ibid sub section 6. 
113 [1989] ECR 3355. 
114
 Summary, paragraph 2 available at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61988CJ0027:EN:HTML, [accessed on 8 
November 2012]. 
115 S.49A (2) of the SA Act. 
116 S. 99 of the FCA. 
117 Ibid s 75. 
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These divisions/departments, however, are not independent; they function under the direction 
and supervision of the chairman or DG and there is no wall between them. For example, the 
DG, who has the mandate to decide whether the complaint is to be entertained by the FCC or 
not, also has the powers to order further investigation of the complaint.
118
 
In the United States of America (USA), in spite of the fact that the Federal Trade 
Commission is vested with the powers to administer all issues of anti-trust, the Commission 
has further powers to establish independent departments such as the Bureau of 
Competition,
119
 which is vested with investigation and prosecutorial powers, and an 
Administrative Law Judge vested with adjudicative powers.
120
 The decision of the 




Part IV of the FCCPR
122
 provides for the investigation of complaints and hearing. The 
investigation department on the instructions of the DG investigates any alleged prohibited 
practice, provided that it is not pending or has not been reported before any other adjudicative 
body.
123
 However, the DG may order that the complaint will not be entertained by the FCC 
and give notice of non-referral and reason thereof.
124
 An applicant aggrieved by the decision 
of the DG may apply to the FCC to have the matter determined by it.
125
 The FCCPR rule is 
silent on the time-frame within which an application may be referred to the FCC. This may 
amount to delay of justice. In other jurisdictions like SA the notice of non-referral is issued 
within one year after submission of the complaint or as extended.
126
 
The notice of non-referral may cause problems to a complainant. He/she has no access 
to the offending firm to conduct investigations as compared to the FCC which has resources 
and powers to compel a firm to provide information, and where necessary, to conduct a 
search and extract the relevant information. In the South African case of Sasol Oil (Pty) v 
                                                             
118 See rule 10 and 12 of the FCCPR. 
119 Part 2 subpart A of 16 Code of Federal Regulation provided for investigation power. Section 2.8 particularly 
separates investigation from hearing and is conducted by a separate and independent section of the 
Commission ie a Bureau of Competition. See 16 CFR 0.16 Bureau of Competition available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/16/0.16, [accessed on 14 September 2012]. 
120 Part 3 of the code provides for adjudication. 16 CFR 3, Subpart E available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/16/3/subpart-E, [accessed on 14 September 2012]. See also Neale (note 
53) at 383.  
121
 Neale (note 53) at 385-6, see also s 45. (Sec. 5) (c) and (g). 
122 Note 109. 
123 Rule 10 (2) and (3) of the FCCPR. 
124 Ibid sub rule 4 and 5. 
125 Ibid rule 10 (6). 





 the Commission issued a notice of non-referral to the complainant 
who further decided to refer the matter directly to the tribunal for determination.
128
  The 
Competition Appeal Court (CAC) was of the view that; ‘[i]t is to be regretted that this case 
was litigated without the benefit of the Competition Commission and its investigative powers. 
As a result, the only evidence…was that of the respondent (complainant) which clearly had 
limited access to the industry’.
129
  
3.2.2 Prosecutorial and Adjudicative powers of the FCC   
The enforcement department plays a prosecutorial role during adjudication before the FCC.
130
 
This role extends to the FCT in case an appeal is made against the decision of the FCC.
131
 
Before an oral hearing the FCC supplies the findings of its investigation to the respondent 
who is obliged to respond within a specified period.
132
 Statutory time-limit for filing 
correspondence documents is not uncommon: the Civil Procedure Code Act
133
 gives a time-
limit for the defendant to file a written statement of defence and it may extend it. The parties 
to the proceedings are entitled to ‘a statement of the case setting out the facts of the case and 
the relevant provisions of the law alleged to have been contravened’.
134
  
When the FCC sits for a hearing it should be composed of five members including the 
chairman, the DG and three other members.
135
 However, the hearing may be conducted where 
there is a quorum of three members including the chairman.
136
 Lack of quorum nullifies the 
entire findings. In Tanzania Breweries Ltd v Serengeti Breweries Ltd and Fair Competition 
Commission,
137
 the FCT nullified the decision of the FCC because the tenure of the office of 
the Chairman who sat on the panel had expired.  
The FCC may conduct a pre-hearing for the purposes of identifying areas of 
disagreement between the parties. It has also powers to determine its own jurisdiction
138
 and 
                                                             
127 [2006] 1 CPLR 37 (CAC). 
128 Ibid at 39. 
129 Ibid at 57. 
130 Rule 18 (1) of FCCPR. 
131 Ibid rule 75. 
132 Ibid rule 18 (3).  
133 Order VIII rule 2, Act No 49 of 1966 (Tanzania).  
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 Rule 12 (3) of FCCPR. 
135 S 62 (6) of the FCA.  
136 Ibid s 73 (5). 
137 Consolidated Tribunal Appeals No 4 and 5 of 2010 at 48. 
138 See TANROADS V Global Outdoor Systems (T) Ltd and others, Appeal No 4 of 2009, at 19 -20 (FCT). The 
FCC gave a ruling on objection of want of jurisdiction.   
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other issues related to legal proceedings.
139
 In the hearing parties may appear either 
personally or through their legal representatives and the hearing may be conducted in public 
or in camera where there are reasons to justify it.
140
 Third parties who have material interest 
in the hearing also have a right to participate.
141
 The hearing is conducted following the 
normal procedure of conducting trials in ordinary courts, ‘but the FCC shall not be bound by 
the formal rules of evidence’.
142
 The FCC ‘shall adopt an inquisitorial procedure in the 
hearing rather than an adversarial.’
143
   
The hearing may be conducted in the absence of either party provided that the notice 
of the hearing was served to the absent party and there is proof that such notice was duly 
served.
144
 Neither the FCA nor the FCCPR indicate whether an ex parte proof or judgement 
may be set aside.
145
 Non-appearance may be due to factors other than insufficient notice such 
as serious illness which could not be communicated to the hearing authority.
146
 The FCC may 
also consolidate proceedings
147
 of the same nature, but parties should be given notice and 
intention of consolidation and time to respond, normally fourteen days after the notice. The 
FCC will not consolidate the proceedings where there is an objection from either party unless 
and until that objection has been dealt with.
148
 
3.2.3 Decision of the FCC 
After the closing of the hearing, the FCC is required to release its decision within forty five 
working days, provided that where it deems fit, the time may be extended, but not for more 
than fifteen working days.
149
 According to FCCPR
150
 a decision is made through a majority 
vote by all members but the chairman has the casting vote.
151
 A judgement shall contain a 
brief of the case, the date and place of proceedings, summary of issues, opinion and 
arguments of the parties, the decision and reasons thereof: and in case of any order (for 
                                                             
139 Rule 20 of FCCPR. 
140 Ibid rule 22. 
141 Ibid rule 18 (9). 
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143 Ibid rule 17 (1) and (2). 
144 Ibid rule 27 (3). 
145 Order IX Rule 13 (1) of the code (note 133), provides for setting aside the ex parte judgment. 
146 In Kanoria and others v Guinnes [2006] EWCA Civ. 222 [2006] Arb LR 513 quoted in Blackaby N et all 
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147 Serengeti case (note 137) at 5.  
148 Rule 29 of FCCPR. 
149 Ibid rule 33 (2) and (3). 
150 Rule 32 (1) and 33 (1) (4) of FCCPR. 
151 S 73 (1)-(4) and (6) of the FCA and rule 30 and 32 of FCCPR. 
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example a compliance order), the date to enforce such an order and the opinion of a 
dissenting member, if any.
152
 
A judgement may contain an administrative fine and a compliance order.
153
 In a 
serious violation of competition law, administrative sanctions are imposed which are punitive 
and deterrent in nature. In other jurisdictions, like the USA and SA,
154
 criminal sanctions are 
imposed in cartel cases.
155
 The FCA does not impose criminal sanctions on violators of the 
Act.  
The purpose of a compliance order (cease and desist) is to restore competition. Failure 
to comply with a compliance order by the party amounts to an offence.
156
 However, the FCA 
does not provide for a fine for non-compliance of the order.
157
 There is a need to set a fine for 
non-compliance of such order.  
The word ‘offence’ as provided for in the FCA is a misnomer. It does not mean an 
offence that attracts a criminal sanction. The FCC may only impose a fine of not less than five 
percent and not exceeding ten percent of the firm’s annual turnover (an offence of non- 
compliance of compliance order is excluded).
158
 In the Serengeti case, the FCC ordered 




The liability of the Company extends to its directors and managers, but the FCA is 
uncertain on how to fine these individuals.
160
 It is uncertain due to the fact that section 60(3) 
of the FCA provides that ‘…where a body corporate is convicted of the offence, every such 
director, manager or officer of the body corporate shall be deemed to be guilty of that 
offence’ unless there is evidence that excludes his participation. The fine imposed on the 
body corporate/firm ranges between five percent and ten percent of the annual turnover. 
Should this annual turnover apply to the income (salary) of the directors or managers, so that 
                                                             
152 Ibid. 
153 Tanzania Breweries Ltd was ordered by FCC ‘to immediately refrain from removing its competitor’s POS 
materials at the outlets and entering into anti-competitive branding agreements with outlet owners’, see 
Serengeti case (note 68) at 53.  
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 S 74 of SA Act as amended by s 13 of Act No 1 of 2009. 
155 Murakami Masahiro ‘Competition Rules and Enforcement in US, EU and Japan’ in Jones CA and 
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when found guilty they are fined on the basis of their annual earnings? The FCA ought to set 
the fine for the natural persons who were in the management posts and actually caused a 
company to breach the FCA. Also the minimum fine of five percent of annual turnover could 
be argued to be very high as compared to the general business of the firm. A firm might deal 
with more than one product in the market, and if the firm commits anti-competitive conduct 
against one product only, the fine might be charged over the entire business of the firm.  
The decision of the FCC is executed by the court without any further examination by 
the court that executes it, and may be sent before any court on the Tanzanian mainland for 
execution, including the High Court.
161
 According to s 61 of the FCA, the decision of the 
FCC is appealable to the FCT.  













SOURCE: UNCTAD-Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: United 
Republic of Tanzania, Overview, New York and Geneva, 2012 at 14. 
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3.3 The FCT  
The Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) is established under section 83 of the FCA. It is an 
appellate organ consisting of a chairman who is a judge of the High Court of Tanzania and six 
other members who are appointed by the president.
162
 The FCA is silent on the tenure for 
holding the office by the chairman. It only provides for the tenure for the members of the 
FCT. It provides that a member will preside in the office for a period not exceeding three 
years.
163
 It is not certain whether the term ‘member’ includes the chairman of the FCT. 
Arguably, this term excludes the chairman of the FCT from the membership of the FCT when 
the question of tenure is taken into consideration. The inference may be drawn from the same 
FCA which under section 63 (7), provides that the tenure for holding the office by the 
chairman and DG of the FCC is four years and other members is three-five years respectively. 
So it separates the tenure for holding the office of the chairman of the FCC and its members, 
but when it comes to the question of tenure of the chairman of the FCT it is unclear.  
It is also uncertain whether the president will take into consideration the issues of 
gender sensitivity when appointing the members as the law is silent on that aspect.
164
 It is 
noted that all members of the FCT are appointed by the president, as opposed to the FCC 
where the chairman is appointed by the president and other members are appointed by the 




The members of the FCT including the chairman serve on a part-time basis and there 
is no deputy chairman. In the event that the chairman is unable to act, other members may not 
conduct the hearing and they have no mandate to appoint the deputy chairman. The FCA 




The post of deputy chairman is crucial and other jurisdictions like South Africa have 
mandated the president to designate a member of the tribunal as a deputy chairman whose 
                                                             
162
 S 83 (2) (a) of the FCA. 
163 Ibid sub section (5). 
164 S 26 (2) of SA Act at least touches issues of gender sensitive since it provides that ‘…tribunal consists of the 
chairman and not less than three, but not more than, other women or men appointed by the president…’  
165 S 83(3) of the FCA.  
166 Ibid s 85(6). 
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duties are to perform the functions of chairman in his/her absence.
167
 However, in South 
Africa, the tribunal is not headed by a judge. The FCA leaves a vacuum as to what should be 
done in the absence of the chairman. It is uncertain whether the president will appoint another 
judge to act in the temporary absence of the Chairman.  
In the United Kingdom, the law is clear that the Secretary of State appoints both the 
chairman and the deputy chairman. In the absence of the chairman, the deputy takes over and, 
in the absence of both, the Secretary of State designates a person from the other staff.
168
 
3.3.1 Appellate power of FCT 
The FCT hears all appeals originating from the FCC.
169
 It is not a court of record despite the 
fact that it is presided over by a judge of the High Court, although it has powers similar to the 
High Court when performing its duties
170
 and its decisions are enforced like any order or 
judgement of the High Court and are final.
171
  
The approach taken in South Africa is that the CAC is an appellate body on 
competition matters. It is presided over by a panel of three judges;
172
 however its decision is 
appealable (with leave) to the Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court on 
constitutional issues.
173
 The FCT has a single part-time judge presiding with other three 
members who are non lawyers. It is privileged to have personnel with complex knowledge in 
industry, commerce and economics. The FCA requires the FCT to be guided by the ‘rules of 
natural justice’,
174
 yet it abuses both the Constitution and rules of natural justice by limiting 
the right to appeal.  
The FCT has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, and extract evidence 
and documents from them.
175
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3.3.2 Appeal procedures 
The procedure for appeal to the FCT is provided by its rules.
177
 All appeals are directed to the 
registrar of the FCT.
178
 A person who intends to appeal against the order or decision of the 
FCC must file a notice of appeal not later than fourteen days after the decision.
179
 This rule is 
read together with rule 75 (3) of the FCCPR which provides that ‘an appeal shall be made in 
not more than twenty eight days after notification or publication of the decision’. The two 
rules connote that a person who intends to appeal must file a notice of appeal not later than 
fourteen days after the publication of the decision. Thereafter, he may file a memorandum of 
appeal not more than twenty eight days after notification or publication of the decision. If the 
notice is filed but the potential appellant fails to comply with the time limit he or she shall be 
deemed to have withdrawn the notice of appeal and may be subjected to pay costs.
180
  
The notice must contain the signature of the appellant and particulars of parties and 
the nature of the decision appealed against.
181
 The appellant after filing a notice must within 
seven days serve the same to the respondent, and the registrar will also serve such a notice to 
the FCC within three days of receipt. Any person served with the notice must respond to it 
within seven days.
182
 The FCTR use the term ‘days’ to set the time limits; it does not plainly 
indicate whether the term ‘days’ exclude weekends and public holidays. The FCCPR is 
certain in setting time limits: it provides that the FCC shall take into account working days as 
well as public holidays when setting the time limits and the term ‘working days’ appears 
severally in the rules.
183
 
Commonly, the appellant applies for an appeal, first to have the matter re-tried by a 
competent appellate authority, and secondly to stop the implementation of the order of the 
lower authority. There are two conflicting approaches on the question of procedure of stay of 
execution. 
One approach is that the appeal plays an automatic role of staying the execution of an 
order appealed against, and this is what the FCA provides for. It states that, on application of 
an appeal ‘the order shall, unless the FCT otherwise orders, be stayed pending the 
                                                             
177 The Fair Competition Tribunal Rules, 2006 (FCTR). 
178
 Rule 4 of FCTR. 
179 Ibid rule 7 (2). 
180
 Ibid rule 10. 
181 TANROAD case (note 138) at 12. 
182 Rule 7(4)-(6) of FCTR. 
183 See rules 33, 44, 45, 56, 59, 60 and 76. 
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determination of the appeal’.
184
 This approach is supported by a South African case, South 
Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd
185
 where the court 
stated that: 
It is today the accepted common law rule of practice in our Courts that generally the 
execution of a judgment is automatically suspended upon the noting of an appeal, with 
the result that, pending the appeal, the judgment cannot be carried out and no effect may 
be given thereto, except with the leave of the Court which granted the judgment. To 
obtain such leave the party in whose favour the judgment was given must make special 
application.  
The second approach is that stay of execution is done by application. This is supported 
by the Civil Procedure Code (Tanzania) which provides that an appeal per se does not operate 
as a stay of execution.
186
 Similarly, in South Africa, the other approach is that the court may 
not stay or suspend the execution of an order unless and until an application is made in that 
respect.
187
 Davis JP made it clear that an application to stay execution may only be made after 
an appeal is lodged before a competent appellate body.
188
 My opinion is that the FCA should 
be compatible with the general law that governs civil procedure in Tanzania, thus a stay of 
execution would be subject to a special application made by the interested party. This would 
maintain uniformity of the civil procedure in the Tanzania for both judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies. 
After lodging a notice of appeal, the appellant is also obliged to file a memorandum of 
appeal on the prescribed form not later than thirty days from the date the notice was lodged 
(the presumption is thirty working days). The same applies on cross-appeal. The appellant 
after filling a memorandum of appeal before the FCT should also serve the same to the 
respondent within seven days.
189
 The memorandum of appeal is accompanied by the copies of 
the decision or order appealed against (normally served in ten copies) and should state the 
grounds of appeal, relief sought and must be signed by the appellant.
190
 
After receiving a memorandum of appeal with its attachments, the respondent must 
respond within fourteen days.
191
 The FCT will publish the intended appeal in its website or a 
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31 
 
widely circulated local newspaper to make it known to any interested person who might wish 
to object it within seven days.
192
 A party who intends to object the notice of appeal should 
apply to FCT before hearing, otherwise such an objection will not be entertained during the 
hearing of the appeal.
193
 
3.3.3 Hearing of appeal 
After the filing process the Registrar must give a notice of the hearing of an appeal ten days
194
 
before the hearing date, unless the date was fixed by the consent of the parties.
195
 The quorum 
for appeal meetings is at least three members including the chairman.
196
 The FCT has the 
power to reject the appeal wholly or in part where there are sufficient grounds to do so.
197
 It 
may conduct appeal meetings in camera where it deems fits to do so, and any document 
proven to be confidential will be treated in a confidential manner.
198
  
The FCT may confirm or reverse the findings of the FCC or order the proceedings to 
be conducted afresh. A copy of an order or decision made by the FCT must be sent to the 
FCC and to any party who was not present at the proceedings.
199
 In the event that the 
appellant does not appear on the hearing date, the FCT has the option to dismiss the appeal or 
adjourn to a future date.
200
  
The appellant may within seven days after dismissal of appeal apply for restoration. 
The FCT may also order ex parte proof, in the event that the appellant appears but the 
respondent does not.
201
 Like the FCCPR, the FCTR is silent on whether there is a remedy for 
setting aside ex parte proceedings or judgement.
202
 
The FCT also has the power to order costs in case the appellant withdraws the appeal 
without the consent of the respondent or when the appeal is finally determined and may order 
security for costs to be deposited.
203
 The judgement of the FCT may be pronounced by any 
                                                             
192 Ibid rule13. 
193 TANROAD case (note 138) at 13. 
194 See pages 29- 30 on the application of the term ‘days’ and ‘working days’. 
195 Rule 24 of FCTR. 
196 Ibid rule 25. 
197 Ibid rule 27. In TANROAD case at 21, it rejected the appeal wholly on the ground that the interlocutory order 
did not determine the matter finally. 
198
 Rules 28 and 29 of FCTR. 
199 Ibid rule 35. 
200 Ibid rule 36 (1). 
201 Ibid sub rule 2. 
202 See note 145. 





 There is no appeal against a decision of the FCT.
205
 The only remedy available 
for an aggrieved party is to apply for review before the same FCT.
206
 This remedy is limited 
to the correction of errors on records.  
If the FCT rehears the dispute and makes errors in fact or in law, what body may make 
the external checks and balances if the ordinary court is deprived of this role? In Federal 
Trade Commission v Gratz
207
 the court was of the view that the ordinary court reserves its due 
process power to rehear the matter and makes further orders. Where evidence is watertight 
and the findings of the Commission sustained, the appellate court still reserves the powers to 
deal with a matter of law relevant to that appeal.  
In addition, in Federal Trade Commission v Motion Pictures Advertising Services 
Company,
208
 Justice Frankfurter commented on the power of the appellate courts in anti-trust 
cases by stating that the question whether an act amounts to anti-trust practice is a question of 
law that a court should be given a final jurisdiction. The lack of mechanism for appeal of 
decision of the FCT and the functions vested in the FCC are procedural problems which are 
unconstitutional and breach the principle of natural justice as discussed below. 
FIGURE 2: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK UNDER THE FCA 
                                                                       It is established under section 83 of the FCA,                                     
                                                                       and it has appellate authority and its decision  




                                                                      It is established under section 62 of the FCA, and   
                                                                    it has investigation, prosecution and 
                                                                    adjudication authority. 
Source: Tanzanian Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003. 
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3.4 The effect of the multiple functions of the FCC and the final appellate jurisdiction 
of the FCT 
This part of the dissertation discusses how the High Court of Tanzania and FCT dealt with the 
challenges raised by stakeholders on the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the FCA.  
3.4.1 The High Court of Tanzania and unconstitutionality of the FCC’s multiple 
functions 
 
In 2008 the FCC handled a competition case on notification of merger and abuse of dominant 
power in the Fair Competition Commission v Tanzania Cigarette Company Ltd (TCC).
209
 
This was the first case to be handled by the FCC and the very first case that questioned the 
constitutionality of the multiple powers of the FCC in Tanzania Cigarette Company Ltd v The 
Fair Competition Commission and the Attorney General
210
 (TCC’s case). The former case 
gave birth to the latter one.  
Brief facts of the TCC case 
The petitioner (TCC) intended to merge its business with Iringa Tobacco Company Ltd (ITC) 
which would result in the assets of ITC being sold to TCC. The petitioner made inquiry as to 
whether the merger proposal was objectionable under the terms of the FCA, and, concluding 
that it is not notifiable, concluded the merger. The FCC alleged that the petitioner had 
violated the law by completing the merger without notification and approval by it. 
The petitioner argued that at the time of the merger transaction the Commissioners of 
the FCC were not yet appointed and the threshold notification was published in 17
th
 January 
2007 and made to operate retrospectively from 10
th
 March 2006 ( the merger transaction took 
place on 17
th
 September 2005). It further avers that the exercise of the FCC’s accusatory and 
adjudicative powers infringes some of its constitutional rights. The FCC overruled the 
preliminary objections and ordered the hearing of the complainant. The petitioner sought 
redress before the High Court thus giving rise to TCC’s case. 
The petitioner argued before the High Court that the first respondent (The FCC) made 
itself a judge of its own cause, thus infringing its right to a fair hearing as enshrined under 
article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution of Tanzania. Thus, the petitioner requested the High Court 
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to grant a declaration that section 69(1) of the FCA is unconstitutional since it gives the FCC 
jurisdiction to determine complaints initiated by itself. 
The second respondent (Attorney General (AG)) contended that the merger transaction 
was notifiable whether the threshold notification of merger was published or not, and argued 
that the Commissioners of the FCC were already appointed when the merger transaction was 
concluded. However the court did not entertain the contention since the High Court is not an 
appellate body on competition matter, and the intention of the petition was to request the High 
Court to exercise its original jurisdiction empowered by both the Constitution and the Basic 
Rights and Duties Enforcement Act (BRADEA)
211
 to declare a provision of the law a 
nullity.
212
 The AG, however, submitted two preliminaries objections (PO), one being that the 
petitioner ought to have exhausted available remedies before filing the petition to the High 
Court. The High Court determined the PO and ruled that the petitioner should first exhaust the 
opportunity available under the FCA, that is, to appeal to the FCT before seeking a remedy in 
the High Court. The petition was dismissed with costs, thus the questions of 
unconstitutionality of s 69(1) of FCA and the powers of the FCC remain unsettled to date. 
To comment on the ruling, the High Court had a duty to ask itself what the petitioner 
before it sought? It is a constitutional issue, declaration of a provision of the law. The 
petitioner was not challenging the findings of the FCC per se, rather the powers vested in the 
FCC by the FCA. The FCT does not have power to declare any law void. In Tanzania there is 
a rebuttable presumption that ‘a piece of legislature or provision in a statute’ is 
constitutional.
213
 The FCT would obvious presumed that s 69 of the FCA is constitutional. 
The High Court allowed itself to be tied up with technicalities of section 8(2) of the 
BRADEA which obstruct dispensation of justice, thus contradicting the requirement of the 
Constitution which direct courts ‘to dispense justice without being tied up with technical 
provisions which may obstruct dispensation of justice’.
214
 It is a question of ‘wait and see’ 
since the matter is before the Supreme Court for appeal.
215
 
The impartiality of the FCC was also challenged in the case of Tanzania Breweries 
Ltd v Serengeti Breweries Ltd and the FCC, Consolidated Tribunal Appeals No 4 and 5 of 
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 Ss 5, 6, 8, and 10(1) of Cap 3 R.E 2002. 
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2010. This appeal originates from complaint No 2 of 2009 which was the second case to be 
handled by the FCC. 
Brief facts of the TBL case 
The FCC in complaint No 2 of 2009 held that the appellant (TBL) is liable for contravening 
both s.8 (1) and 10(1) of the FCA by entering into branding agreements which had led 
automatically to serious and important distortions of competition in the beer market and abuse 
of dominant position. It ordered the appellant to pay a fine of five percent of its annual 
turnover. In addition a compliance order was issued (refrain from removing its competitor’s 
signage and posters or POS materials at the outlets and entering into anti-competitive 
branding agreements with outlet owners). 
Aggrieved by the decision of the FCC, the appellant appealed to the FCT. It filed two 
appeals, No 4 and 5 respectively, but the FCT consolidated them. The appellant submitted ten 
grounds of appeals including failure of the FCC to act in accordance with principles of natural 
justice and procedural fairness, thus failing to act independently and impartially (the FCC is 
an investigatory and adjudicatory authority in competition). The appellant further avers that 
the proceedings and the decision of the FCC are a nullity because the FCC was not properly 
constituted when it determine the matter. This ground took priority and it was concluded that 
the meetings of the FCC held during determination of complaint No 2 of 2009 lacked a proper 
quorum and such a decision was invalid and therefore a nullity. The effect of this finding is 
that the FCT did not discuss other grounds of appeal raised, including the question of 
impartiality of the FCC.  
The summary of the two cases above indicated the efforts made by stakeholders to 
challenge (unsuccessfully) the provisions of the FCA that give multiple powers to the FCC.  
3.4.1.1 Impartiality of the FCC 
In the TCC case the petitioner requested the High Court to give a declaration order in term of 
section 69(1) of the FCA. This was however, not done, as discussed above. S 69(1) of the 
FCA provides as follows, ‘[t]he Commission (FCC) may initiate a complaint against an 
alleged prohibited practice’. Subsection 2 further allows a person to submit a complaint 
against an alleged prohibited practice before the FCC for investigation. The court interpreted 
this provision and stated that, ‘[t]he provision creates a situation in which it is the FCC that 
investigates an alleged prohibited practice, then prepares and files a complaint before itself, 
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prosecutes a complaint before itself and goes on to adjudicate over the same complaint’.
216
 
The provision of the FCA therefore concentrated investigative, accusatory and adjudication 
powers to the FCC. According to OECD report, ‘combining the function of investigation and 
adjudication in a single institution may save costs but may also dampen internal critique; it 
may raise a concern about the absence of checks and balances’.
217
  
The UNCTAD report at page 67 stated that the FCC is a fairly independent agent in 
performance of its functions. This finding is based on section 62 (2) of the FCA which 
provides that, ‘[t]he Commission shall perform its functions and exercise its power 
independently and impartially without fear or favour’. This however connotes an 
independence from external interference which by itself is not absolute, since the members of 
the FCC are appointed by the executive to perform administrative duties (quasi-judicial 
function) without the approval of any other organ. In summary both the president and the 
minister responsible for trade affairs have powers to hire, set fee and allowance, and fire 
the members of the FCC,
218
 so their independence is impaired. 
The impartiality of the FCC is affected by lack of internal independence. The 
separation of powers among the departments of the FCC is not absolute. The provisions of the 
FCA indicated below show that both the chairman and DG who sit for adjudication also 
participate in investigation processes. In TCC and TBL cases, if the allegation that the FCC 
acts as an investigator and adjudicator in alleged anti-competitive practice were determined, 
then factual evidence could be adduced to prove how the chairman or DG of the FCC 
participated in both investigation and adjudication, as was done in the Jamaica Stock 
Exchange case discussed under part 3.4.2 of this dissertation. 
Does the interference of the chairman or DG in an investigation violate the 
fundamental rights to fair hearing as enshrined in the Constitution? Article 13(6) (a) of the 
Constitution
219
 provides that, ‘[w]hen the right and duties of any person are being determined 
by the court or any other agency, the person shall be entitled to a fair hearing….’ This simply 
means a decision-maker when determining a right of an individual should be free from any 
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bias created from whatever manner. It is apparent that section 69 of the FCA gives power to 
the FCC to be a judge of its own cause, causing bias as discussed herein below. 
The partiality of the FCC may be proved by giving facts or the circumstances that 
surround the entire process of determining a right. So, to decide whether section 69 of the 
FCA causes the FCC to be partial one has to analyse the loopholes provided by FCA. In 
Johnson v Mississippi
220
 it was stated that a party to litigation has the right to be heard by an 
impartial decision-maker. The question is who is an ‘impartial decision-maker’? In Caperton 
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co 129,
221
 it was stated that ‘[t]he inquiry is an objective one. The court 
asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in 
his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias’.  
The unconstitutional potential for bias created by the FCA is that the same person who 
takes part in investigation of prohibited practice sits for adjudication of the same. For 
example when the allegation is submitted before the FCC for investigation, the DG has 
power to decide whether the matter is to be investigated by the FCC or not. The DG has 
power to issue a notice of non-referral to the person who submitted a complaint. The 
complainant then has the right to refer the complaint directly to the FCC for adjudication,
222
 
where the same DG who issued a notice of no referral forms part of the hearing meeting of 
the FCC.
223
 Also, the chairman or the DG of the FCC has the power to issue a summons 
and request for a search warrant from the FCT for the purposes of conducting 
investigation. The investigation department cannot call a person to supply information unless 
it requests the chairman or DG to issue a summons to call that person. Section 71(1) of the 
FCA provides that, ‘…a member of the Commission may by the summons signed by the 
chairman or Director General serve on that person…’to produce any information or 
document to the FCC. 
For searching processes, the chairman or the DG apply for the search warrant from the 
FCT and appoint the FCC’s staff to participate in searching. Section 71 (5) of the FCA 
provides that the FCT ‘shall issue a search warrant authorizing a police officer accompanied 
by staff of the Commission duly authorized by the chairman of the Commission to enter 
the premises and conduct search…’The FCA does not vest these powers in the head of the 
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investigation department; rather to the chairman and DG of the FCC. These examples 
extracted from the FCA prove that the chairman and DG of the FCC participate in both 
investigation and adjudication of alleged prohibited practice. To avoid lack of neutrality, the 
FCC when it has investigated the dispute, needs to recuse itself in adjudication to let the 
neutral organ decide the matter.  
Waelbroeck and Fosselard argued that everyone is entitled to be heard by an impartial 





 also argued that, giving the Commission all the powers will create a so-called 
‘prosecutorial bias’, as naturally the Commission will have bias in favour of its findings 
during the investigations when it comes to the question of adjudication, a ‘hindsight bias or 
desire to justify past efforts’.
226
 They relate this bias to the one possessed by the lawyer in 
favour of his or her client.  
Would a prudent person expect that the FCC, having used its resources in 
investigations and drawn an inference that there was infringement of the provisions of the 
FCA, would then in trial declare that its findings in the investigations hold no water? Montag 
argued that, ‘it is understandable in human terms that Commission officials sometimes want 
to push through what they perceive to be their case. And it explains why arguments put 
forward by the parties often appear to fall on deaf ears’.
227
 Although the decision of the FCC 
is appealable to the FCT, it is impossible for the FCT to declare the acts of the FCC void on 
grounds of wants of jurisdiction because the provisions of the FCA supply loopholes for the 
FCC to be a judge of its own acts. 
In Findlay v United Kingdom,
228
 the European Court stated that to ‘maintain 
impartiality, the tribunal...must also be impartial from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must 
offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect’. 
The test to apply for impartiality is the nature of the incidence supported by the 
evidence that suggests that there was danger of bias on the side of the adjudicative body.
229
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Thus, the first step is to examine whether the surrounding circumstances may support the 
allegation that the decision-maker is biased or not. The next is to look at it from the viewpoint 
of the prudent or fair-minded observer, and decide whether inference may be drawn that such 
leading circumstances are in real danger of bias on the side of a decision-maker.
230
  
In Porter and Another v Magill,
231
 the Local Government Finance Act 1982 (England) 
vested the Auditor Commission with power to investigate, make up the complaint and hear 
and determine it.
232
 The court was of the view that ‘[t]he question is whether the fair-minded 
and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the tribunal was biased’.
233
 It further stated that no fair-minded and informed 
observer would suggest that the auditor, who investigated the matter and prosecuted it and 
made a decision, was free from bias. In the light of this, as it was put forward in the TCC 
case, the chairman/DG of the FCC who participates in investigation and sits for adjudication 
may not be free from bias. 
In the TCC case, the FCC in its submissions contended that ‘accusatory and 
adjudicative powers are exercised separately’ and that it is impartial and independent since 
the initiation of complaints ‘do not involve a single individual or single department within the 
FCC, which both initiates and decides the complaints’.
234
 Although this submission was not 
determined by the court, (the court ruled that the petitioner should exhaust available 
opportunities before it sought remedy before the High Court) it is clear from the provisions of 




If that is the case why does the Chairman or DG issue a summons and not the director 
of the head of the investigation department? The FCA does not guarantee that the DG or the 
chairman will not interrogate the summonsed person before referring him or her to the 
investigation department for further investigation.  
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Why does the Chairman or DG apply for a search warrant and appoint a member of 
the FCC to accompany the police in the search, and not leave the investigation department to 
work alone? The chairman or DG applies for the search warrant. This indicates that they 
know the nature of the investigation and they are aware at what stage the search warrant is 
required. If the investigation department were to be independent from the control of the 
chairman or DG in due course of performing its function, the FCA or the FCCPR could 
empower it to summons any person to provide information to it, and where it deems fit, it 
would also be empowered to apply for search warrants and act alone without waiting for the 
authorization of the chairman of the FCC. 
Why does the DG have a mandate to order investigation and yet it may decide not to 
refer a complaint to the FCC? If the investigation department were independent, the 
complaint would have been submitted to it for investigation. Where it deemed fit, it would 
refer a matter to the FCC for adjudication depending on the evidence on record, or issue a 
notice of non-referral to the complainant. The Chairman and the DG form part of the FCC 
hearing meetings. Indeed, they participate in investigation and adjudication. The powers of 
the European Commission, which is also an investigator and adjudicator of anti-competitive 
practices,
236
 have been challenged vehemently by a number of commentators.
237
  
The fact that the FCC investigates complaints and establishes sufficient evidence to 
support its case, leads to an undisputable inference that it is likely be influenced, and be 
partial, as it cannot make a decision against itself. A decision-maker who is biased cannot 
easily give a fair trial as he or she may be influenced to favour one side.
238
One might say that 
an empty-minded judge is a good judge compared to a well-informed judge who might have 
pre-judged a matter before a hearing. In other words, a good judge is one who makes a 
decision based on facts and evidence submitted during the hearing, and not one who makes a 
decision based on facts that came into his or her knowledge, prior to the arguments of the 
disputants. The premises of the above discussion draw an inference that section 69 of the 
FCA allows the FCC to be partial in due course of performing its duties and therefore 
breaches the fundamental principles of fair hearing as guaranteed by the Constitution of 
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Tanzania. The following section shows how the Supreme Court of Jamaica dealt with a 
similar situation. 
3.4.2 The Supreme Court of Jamaica and unconstitutionality of a Commission’s 
multiple functions 
Courts have the role of interpreting and applying the law. The Supreme Court of Jamaica in 
Jamaica Stock Exchange v Fair Trading Commission,
239
 (JSE case) was called upon to 
interpret the provisions of the Fair Competition Act No 9 of 1993
240
 (FCA 1993) that vested 
the Fair Trading Commission (FTC) with the powers to investigate, initiate a complaint and 
adjudicate the dispute. The court determined the dispute and declared such provisions 
unconstitutional.   
Brief facts of the JSE case  
In 1992 Behring, Bunting & Golding Ltd (BD & G Ltd) applied to the JSE for corporation 
membership. The application was not determined until 1993, and in 1994 BD&G Ltd 
submitted a complaint before the FCT for investigation. The FTC made an investigation on 
the procedures and rules of the JSE concerning the process of admitting new members and 
based on its finding it concluded that the JSE was in breach of the law. It therefore wrote an 
official complaint to the JSE alleging inter alia that the JSE had created a barrier to entry into 
the market since it had failed to respond to an application for membership within a reasonable 
time, therefore abusing its dominant position in the securities market.  
The JSE informed the FTC that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter since the 
FCA 1993 did not apply to the JSE but to the Securities Act. The FTC contended that it had 
jurisdiction. The JSE referred the matter before the court (Judge in Chambers) for 
determination of matters of law that the FCA 1993 was not applicable to it, and further that its 
constitutional right to be heard by an impartial decision-maker was breached when the 
FTC that conducted investigation and lodged a complaint adjudicated the same 
complaint. The court entered judgement in favour of the FTC. Sections 49 and 50 of the FCA 
1993 allow findings of the FTC to be appealed to the ordinary courts. The appellant (JSE) 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Jamaica.  
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The Supreme Court addressed several issues in this case, but the action of the FTC and 
the constitutionality of the FCA 1993 that give the FTC the powers to investigate and 
adjudicate alleged anti-competitive practice are relevant to this dissertation. The FCA of 
Tanzania gives the same powers to the FCC and its constitutionality was challenged 
unsuccessfully before the High Court of Tanzania in the TCC case. In Jamaica the challenge 
of unconstitutionality of the FCA 1993 was successful. Below is the determination of the 
Supreme Court. 
 
 Forte P (Judge) was of the view that ‘[t]o my mind the more substantive contention is 
whether the Commission (the FTC) has, and if so, should have the power to adjudicate upon 
matters which it has itself investigated and itself laid the complaint’.
241
 The evidence on 
record indicated that the officers of the FTC applying the powers vested to them by the FCA 
1993 summonsed the manager of the JSE under threat of penalty and had a thorough 
interview concerning the alleged prohibited practice. There was also a constant 
communication between the FTC and Executive Director of the JSE for purpose of 
investigation. The court observed that ‘[t]here is no guarantee that the Commissioner who 
directed the investigation or might have undertaken the investigation, would not sit and hear 
the complaint’.
242
 It was of the view that the evidence in record ‘has revealed sufficient 
conduct in the officer of the FTC who consulted with the Commission throughout the 
‘investigation’ to establish that there is a real danger of the JSE being the subject of bias in 
determination of the complaints’.
243
 
The investigation and adjudication powers vested in the Commission not only breach 
the ‘common law rule of natural justice’ but also the constitutional right to be heard by ‘an 
impartial tribunal’.
244
 The appeal was allowed and the Supreme Court declared that ‘…the 
action and proceedings being taken and pursued by the FTC against the JSE whereby 
the FTC is performing the functions of investigation, complainant and adjudication is in 
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The court gave its opinion that ‘a problem may however, be remedied for the future if 
the legislature would place those functions in two separate bodies, (the investigative function 
in the FTC and the adjudicative function in the courts or in some other appropriate body)’.
246
 
No one is fit to be a judge in his own cause, Nemo judex idoneus in propria causa est. The 
issue of bias has to be strictly emphasised,
247
 and justice has to be administered impartially.
248
 
Based on the findings of the Supreme Court of Jamaica which are persuasive
249
, it is 
obvious that in Tanzania the multiple functions of the FCC originate from the settings of the 
FCA, and in the TCC case the High Court ought to exercise its constitutional power to declare 
the provisions of the FCA that vest multiple functions in the FCC void and therefore 
unconstitutional, for it breaches the general rules of natural justice and constitutional right of 
fair hearing as enshrined under article 13 (6) (a) of Constitution of Tanzania. 
This decision sensitized many writers who called upon the relevant authorities to 
amend the competition law. According to Derrick, investigative power is to be left to the 
Commission and all the adjudicatory and enforcement functions to be passed on to the 
court.
250
 He admits that the background of compositions of bills and the intention of the 
policy-makers led Jamaica to have a law which is not easy to enforce, and the remedy 
available is to amend the law (FCA 1993).
251
 
On the contrary Gordon
252
 introduced two relevant models to amend the FCA 1993. 
The first model is to separate adjudication and investigation functions into two distinctive 
bodies, which entail the establishment of a new body, which to him is too expensive.
253
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However, to re-set the system in Tanzania together with its various functions should be cheap 
and efficient as demonstrated in the recommendations, since the two institutions are already in 
place.  
The second model is to divide the investigation and adjudication functions within the 
same body (the existing FTC), ‘with the appropriate fire-walls to ensure that the rules of 
natural justice are preserved,’
254
 as in the American model. Gordon prefers this approach. 
However this approach does not work in Tanzania as demonstrated above. There is no 
guarantee of ‘fire-walls’ between the Chairman or the DG and other members of the 
investigation department.  
Based on the above arguments, the comparison between the Jamaican competition 
legal regime and that of Tanzania is relevant to this dissertation because competition law of 
both countries gives multiple functions to the regulatory bodies. These powers had been 
challenged in both countries by stakeholders, successfully in Jamaica (the JES’ case) and 
unsuccessfully) in Tanzania (the TCC’s case). Tanzania has lessons to take from Jamaica, 
first that the status of these multiple powers works against the principle of fair hearing as 
declared by the Supreme Court of Jamaica; secondly that the decisions of regulatory bodies 
are appealable to ordinary courts as per Jamaica competition law.
255
  
3.5 Right to access court for re-hearing (appeal) 
The concern of the TCC case was the right to be heard by an impartial decision-making body 
and the right to appeal. Having discussed the issues of impartiality, this section focuses on 
appeal. From the provision of the FCA there is right to appeal from the FCC to the FCT. 
Section 61 (1) of the FCA provides that a person aggrieved by the decision of the FCC may 
appeal to the FCT, and subsection 2 provides that the appeal shall be by way of rehearing. 
Subsection 4 further provides for grounds for appeal that;  
i) the decision made was not based on evidence produced. 
ii) there was error in law. 
iii) the procedures and other statutory requirements applicable to the FCC were not 
complied with and non-compliance materially affected the determination, and 
iv) the FCC did not have powers to make the determination. 
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The procedures for appeal are straightforward as provided by the FCTR, and discussed under 
parts 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 above. Under this premise, grounds and procedures for appeal from the 
FCC to the FCT as was witnessed by the TBL case above are not in question.  
This dissertation argues that there is no statutory right to appeal from the decision of 
the FCT to the ordinary courts. Where should a person aggrieved by the decision of the FCT 
go, where he/she wishes to challenge that decision on the same grounds stated above if there 
is no a bridge of appeal from the FCT to the ordinary court? Section 61(8) of the FCA 
provides that ‘[t]he decision of the FCT on appeals under this section shall be final’. 
Furthermore section 84 (1) provides that ‘[a] judgement or order of the Tribunal on any 
matter before it shall…be final’.  
There should be a clear distinction between the routes taken by the Tanzania Cigarette 
Company in the TCC case to approach the High Court and the appeal procedure provided by 
the FCA. In the TCC case the defendant/appellant, having found that the FCC had 
investigated it, and lodged a complaint against it, and was in the process of hearing the case, 
realised that its constitutional right to be heard by impartial decision-body was in danger. It 
therefore invoked the provisions of the BRADEA
256
 to approach the High Court to challenge 
the constitutionality of the provision of FCA that give the FCC power of investigation and 
adjudication. It is true that under BRADEA one has to exhaust the FCT route, because it is 
the available local remedy under the FCA, before invoking the High Court.
257
 The FCT, 
however, has no powers to give the declaration orders on the provision of the law, but the 
High Court does. So the High Court was not exercising its appellate power, rather original 
jurisdiction vested in it by the BRADEA.
258
 The High Court gave judgement against the 
appellant, and the appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court.
259
 The appeal is 
pending
260
 and the Supreme Court is exercising its appellate powers to rehear the dispute 
originating from the High Court and not from the FCC. 
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Having clarified the above issues, the arguments still focus on limitation of right to 
appeal from the FCT to the ordinary courts of the law. The UNCTAD report focused on the 
right to appeal to the judge: it refers appeals to the FCT because it is presided over by a judge 
of the High Court and other members. The report touched very little on right to appeal to 
ordinary courts; this dissertation intends to shed light on this. 
Sections 61(8) and 84 (1) of the FCA are vulnerable to unconstitutionality since they 
conflict with the constitutional right of appeal and undermine the doctrine of separation of 
powers, because they vest the administrative bodies with the powers to determine competition 
disputes and exclude courts’ powers of rehearing.  
What is the position of Tanzanian law if the Constitution provides right of appeal but 
another Act of the parliament does not provide for right of appeal? It may be argued that even 
though the FCA does not have specific provisions of appeal to the High Court, appeal is still 
available by invoking provisions of article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution that provides for the 
right to appeal. The Supreme Court of Tanzania put it clearly in the case of Athumani 
Kungubaya & 482 Others v Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission & Tanzania 
Telecommunications.
261
 In this case the labour dispute was entertained by the Industrial 
Court, (which is merely a labour tribunal), and the appellant appealed to the High Court. The 
respondent raised a preliminary objection on want of jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
Industrial Court Act 1967 had no specific provisions for appeal to the High Court. The court 
sustained the objection and dismissed the appeal. 
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the appeal could still 
be brought by virtue of articles 13 (6) (a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court was of the 
view that right to appeal is created by specific provisions of statutes which provide for the 
procedures to appeal. Industrial Court Act 1967 by then did not provide for appeal to the 
High Court.
262
 Sections 61(8) and 84 (1) of the FCA should therefore be amended to provide 
for specific provision for appeals to courts.  
The Constitution provides that the final determination of any individual’s right is 
vested in the judiciary
263
which include powers to rehear the dispute. The appellate power of 
the Court of Appeal is therefore derived from the Constitution. Thus the question of final 
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appellate jurisdiction has to be judged according to the appellate structures created by the 
Constitution
264
and not any other law inferior to it. The Constitution does not give the 
legislature the power to vest a tribunal with a final appellate jurisdiction.
265
  
Finality clauses are very common in private arbitration proceedings where parties 
voluntarily waive their constitutional rights to appeal.
266
 So long as competition proceedings 
do not fall under private arbitration cases, parties should be made aware of their constitutional 
right of appeal to a final appellate body. In Porter’s case, despite the fact that the Commission 
was found to be partial, there was a statutory remedy.
267
 The aggrieved party had the right to 
appeal to the Division Court to have the case heard afresh.  
It may also be argued that although the FCA has no specific provision for appeal to the 
ordinary courts, one may still seek a remedy through judicial review or revision, where the 
court may exercise its inherent power over quasi-judicial bodies.268 The question is whether 
this remedy suffices, or accords an aggrieved party in competition proceedings a sufficient 
recourse.  
3.6  The court and the remedies of judicial review and revision 
In Kingsley v United Kingdom,
269
 it was argued that the adjudicative body cannot be said to have 
breached the rule of natural justice if its decision is ‘subject to subsequent control by a 
judicial body…’ The issue is not a mere control, but rather the extent and effect of judicial 
control over the administrative decision. The decision of the FCT lacks statutory judicial 
control (no appeal to court). The judicial review may be available but does not provide for a 
complete rehearing of the dispute in question.  
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Judicial review is a remedy in public law. It is a supervisory jurisdiction vested in the 
High Court over the inferior courts, tribunal or other public bodies.
270
 It is ‘[a] court’s 
authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act if it is contrary to 
constitutional principles’.
271
 In summary it is a supervisory jurisdiction of the Higher Courts 
over the inferior bodies. According to Lord Diplock, judicial review comes in place where 
there is ‘illegality; irrationality; and procedural impropriety’
272
 in the finding of a 
decision-maker.  
The reviewing authority is concerned with the manner in which a decision is made, 
and the question as to whether such a decision was a right decision is the duty of the 
appellate body. It does not ‘review the merits of a decision’. Dinah Rose was of the view 
that: 
The exercise of judicial review should be contrasted with an appeal “on the 
merits”...In an appeal on the merits, the tribunal is entitled to substitute its own views 
for those of the decision-maker. In contrast, judicial review proceedings are solely 
concerned with the lawfulness of a decision and not its correctness.
273
 
The effect of judicial review is that at the end of the day, when the court finds the 
decision invalid, it refers the matter to the same court /tribunal for retrial. It may be before the 
same panel or a different one. In the case of FCT if this happened, it is referred to the same 
panel since there is only one chairman and there is no substitute chairman. It is therefore 
concluded that the remedy of judicial review is not a satisfactory remedy for a party that is 
aggrieved by a decision of the FCT; the appropriate remedy is to give a party access to a court 
for appeal. It is well settled that, ‘judicial review may not be taken as a panacea for the 




By virtue of section 4 (2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act No 25 of 2002 the 
Supreme Court of Tanzania has revision power. This power however is limited to specific 
grounds and does not give the court power to rehear the dispute. Section 79 of the Civil 
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Procedure Code Act No 49 of 1966 provides that revisionary power is available where there 
is no appeal and it is limited to the fact that the decision-maker: 
i) has exercised a jurisdiction not vested to it by the law; 
ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or 
iii) has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material      
irregularity. 
None of the above grounds replace grounds for appeal stated above. In Mabibo Beer Wines 
and Spirits Ltd v Lukas Mallya and another,
275
 the court of appeal made revision of the 
finding of the FCT and quashed the proceedings and order for retrial.  This remedy does not 
give the court power to re-hear the matter, it is not intended to replace the right to appeal, and 
the remedy available from it is quite different from a remedy available on appeal. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The institutions established by the FCA are relevant for promoting and monitoring 
competition law and policy in Tanzania. However, the manner in which they operate casts 
doubt on the administration of justice as required by due process. The act of the legislature of 
combining powers in one body, and further denying the constitutional right to appeal to 
ordinary court of law, undermines the harmonious relationship between competition law and 
fundamental rights to a fair trial. 
 
The High Court of Tanzania did not solve the problem; the matter however is pending 
before the Supreme Court. The following chapter looks at how South African Competition 
law has dealt with the situation by separating the investigation function from the adjudication 








                                                             




A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SEPARATION OF INVESTIGATIVE AND 
ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS AND COMPETITION AUTHORITIES WITH 
RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA AND TANZANIA 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses convergence and divergence issues with regards to procedural matters 
arising out of enforcement bodies established by legislations of both Tanzania and SA. It 
particularly analyses the investigative powers of the Commissions (in both states), 
adjudicative powers of the Commission (in Tanzania) and Tribunal (in SA). It also reviews 
the appellate powers of Tribunals (in both states), Competition Appeal Court, Supreme Court 
and Constitutional Court as provided under SA competition law.  
The two countries were selected because both are common law countries, and have 
laws that govern competition law which establish rather similar regulatory bodies. However, 
as opposed to Tanzania, in South Africa, the investigation and adjudication functions are 
vested in different bodies, unlike the Tanzanian approach. Furthermore, in SA Competition 
disputes are appealable to an ordinary court of law, an approach not available in Tanzania. 
The functions of Commissions and Tribunals in both states have slight differences. 
In general, institutions discussed in this chapter are the Competition Commission (CC), 
Competition Tribunal (CT), and CAC in SA
276
 and FCC and FCT in Tanzania. However, in 
Tanzania there is a High Court-Commercial Division that deals with commercial issues but 
which is not part of the competition enforcement bodies.  
The High Court of Tanzania-Commercial Division is a suitable division of the High 
Court for appeal of competition disputes. It was established by High Court Registry Rule in 
1999
277
 following the changes of the economic policy in the 1990s. It has similar powers to 
that of the general High Court, the only difference being that the commercial division deals 
specifically with disputes which are commercial in nature, while the general High Court has 
unlimited jurisdiction. 
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In 2005, the High Court Registry Rules were amended and the High Court-Commercial 
Division was vested with appellate jurisdiction on disputes of a commercial nature.
278
 The 
competition disputes are disputes that are commercial in nature, thus this division of the High 
Court might be made an appellate court on competition disputes.   
It may be argued that since the FCT is a specialised body that deals with commercial 
disputes, its decision should not go to ordinary court for appeal, as the appeal judges are not 
specialised in commercial dispute. This argument is defeated by the fact that the 
recommended ordinary court for appeal is the High Court-Commercial division which is an 
expert court in commercial dispute. 
Here follows a comparison between the two countries on the procedure of investigation 
(summons and searching), hearing and appeals. The purpose is to analyse the experience of 
each country in these specific areas and where possible to adapt some lessons from SA 
experience, because its competition law and policy is more advanced than Tanzanian law. 
4.2 Investigation (Commissions) 
Both states have Commissions responsible for investigation of prohibited practices.
279
 They 
investigate the alleged anti-competitive practices and initiate a complaint. They may also 
receive a complaint from a private person and investigate it.
280
 
The right to be heard at the investigation stage is an issue which is not dealt with in 
both laws. In  Chairman, Board on Tariffs and Trade, and others v Brenco inc and others
281
 
the Supreme Court of SA stated that the investigation authority’s aim in visiting premises and 
even conducting interrogation is to establish the accuracy of the information and to satisfy 
itself whether there is prima facie evidence on the alleged breach of the Act. The authority 
does not have to inform the investigated person of every step of the investigation and offer a 
right to be heard at that stage. In short, the Supreme Court specified that to allow the audi 
alteram partem principle in investigation, ‘not only unduly hampers the exercise of 
investigative powers of the investigation authority, but would seek to transform investigative 
                                                             
278 Rule 5A (2) of GN.427/2005. 
279 Sutherland (note 42) at 11-6 -16. See also s 21(1) (c), (d) and (e) of SA Act and s 68 and 71 of the FCA and 
Part IV (a) of FCCPR. 
280 S 49B of SA Act and s 69 of the FCA. 
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process into an adjudicative process…’ Therefore, both legislations correctly do not offer the 
right to be heard at the investigation stage.  
4.2.1 Power to summons 
In the course of investigations, both Commissions have the powers to summons the person 
being investigated to provide relevant information. In South Africa, a person being 
investigated is not obliged to give self-incriminating answers.
282
 In Tanzania a party may give 
self-incriminating answers which are, however, not admissible in any other proceedings other 
than those under the FCA.
283
  
A summons should not be too general, and investigated practices should fall within the 
powers of investigation as provided by relevant law.
284
 A summons that shows that the 
investigation authority is conducting an investigation of any kind of prohibited practice 
recognised by the law is void.
285
  
However, the evidence acquired through an invalid summons may be credible 
evidence or not all depending on the assessment of fairness by the decision-maker. Davis JP, 
quoting the judgement in Ferreira v Levin
286
 was of the view that, ‘fairness is an issue which 
has to be decided upon the facts of each case, and the trial judge is the person best placed to 
take that decision. At times fairness might require that evidence unconstitutionally obtained 
be excluded’.  
4.2.2 Power to enter and search 
In South Africa, a search may be conducted with or without warrant. In the case of a search 
warrant, it is issued either by a judge of the High Court,
287
or a magistrate. The search warrant 
authorises the inspector who may be accompanied by a police officer to enter and search the 
premises.
288
 It is valid if is conducted in good time and is in conformity with search 
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 The expiry date of the search warrant and time of its execution have to be 
considered by the searching officer.
290
 He/she should also consider whether has the powers to 
search without warrant. 
A search warrant is issued when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a 
prohibited practice has taken place, is taking place or is likely to take place on or in those 
premises,’
291
 or when any relevant information is in possession or control of the owner or 
controller of those premises. The investigation authority has the duty to establish sufficient 
grounds that justify the infringement of the right to privacy of a searched person.
292
 
Conversely, in Tanzania, a search warrant is issued by the chairman of the FCT on 
application by the Chairman or DG of the FCC.
293
 The Chairman of the FCT is a judge of the 
High Court and therefore a court official, and a search warrant is an authorisation issued by a 
court official and may be challenged.
294
 The search warrant authorises a police officer to 
conduct a search and not a member of the FCC. However, the chairman may authorise a 
member of the FCC to accompany a police officer.
295
 Furthermore, the search is to be 
witnessed by a justice of the peace or two adult persons from that locality unless there are 
justifiable reasons to dispense with their presence during the search.
296
 The FCC is faced with 
a challenge of having its own specialised personnel to conduct a search. The police officers 
who are authorised to conduct a search are experts in crime and not competition issues. Their 
assistance is only relevant in the situation where there is resistance from the searched person. 
The FCA gives power to search but does not give details on the rights of the searched 
person. In SA, the law plainly provides for the rights of the searched person, such as the right 
to get assistance from a lawyer, to get receipts for the seized items and the right to privileged 
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 It is unclear whether or not some of these rights may be exercised in Tanzania 
since the law is silent.  
Like a summons, a search warrant should be specific in nature, outlining the nature of 
the breach and the scope of the search. Investigation authorities ought to act in accordance 
with the law that vested them with such powers. In Powell NO and others v Van der merwe 
NO and others,
298
 the court stated that;  
A warrant had to convey intelligibly to both searcher and searched the ambit of 
the search it authorised. If a warrant was too general, or if its terms went beyond those 
the authorising statute permitted, the Courts would refuse to recognise it as valid, and it 
would be set aside. It was no cure for an overbroad warrant to say that the subject of the 
search knew or ought to have known what was being looked for: The warrant must itself 
specify its object, and had to do so intelligibly and narrowly within the bounds of the 
empowering statute. 
In South Africa, where evidence on prohibited practices is established, the CC refers a 
complaint to the CT for hearing.
299
 Conversely, in Tanzania the FCC hears the complaint by 
itself,
300
and thus is a judge in its own cause. Its decision is appealable to the FCT. 
The Commissions may issue a notice of non-referral
301
 to the complainant if it deems 
fit. In South Africa the CC issues such a notice within one year after submission of the 
complaint or as extended and it may be issued expressly or impliedly.
302
 The CC ceases the 
investigation and it no longer has jurisdiction to refer that complaint when it issues a notice of 
non-referral.
303
 In Tanzania there is no time limit within which a notice may be issued.
304
 
After receiving a notice of non-referral the complainants in both jurisdictions may refer a 
dispute to the FCC (Tanzania)
305
 or CT (SA)
306
 for determination. 
In South Africa, the respondent may admit the charge of anti-competitive practices; a 
dispute may not be referred to the CT for a hearing of evidence but rather for confirmation of 
consented order.
307
 In the Competition Commission v British Airways PLC,
308
 the CC’s 
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investigations proved a contravention of the Act and the respondent admitted the findings of 
the CC. The CC entered into a settlement agreement with the respondent which was subject to 
confirmation by the CT. There is no consent order in Tanzania; instead where the investigated 
party by conducts admits the allegation the FCC makes a decision.
309
  
4.3 Hearing (Tribunal/Commission) 
In adjudication, both FCC and CT have the power to conduct a pre-hearing conference for 
determination of areas of controversy. However, in Tanzania, the length of time to conduct a 
hearing conference is not set, and this may cause delays because there is no statutory time 
limit that binds the FCC. In South Africa it is clear that the conference is to be conducted 
within twenty business days after completion of filing of documents.
310
 
In South Africa, the CT may have more than one panel of three members but the 
chairperson must ensure that at least one member of each panel has knowledge in legal 
training and experience.
311
 In Tanzania, due to limited number of members of the FCC, only 
one panel is constituted which is headed by a chairman.
312
 Hearing of proceedings is 
governed by the respective rules of the enforcement bodies (FCCPR and CTR). As opposed 
to Tanzania where the rules are silent, in South Africa in case of a lacuna in the rules the CT 
may apply the High Court’s rules.
313
  
In competition disputes, both States adopted the inquisitorial approach,
314
 where the 
decision-maker is duty bound to play an active role to investigate facts concerning the 
dispute. He/she tries to detect the material truth by questioning witnesses
315
 and the ‘ordinary 
rule of evidence does not apply.’
316
  
Parties may appear through their legal representatives.
317
 In South Africa, the decision 
of the CT is subject to the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.
318
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Conversely, in Tanzania the decision of the FCC is executed directly by the court like any 
other decision of the court without the examination of procedural fairness.
319
 
4.4 Appeal (FCT/CAC) 
In Tanzania the FCT is an appellate body and hears all appeals from decision of the FCC.
320
 
The FCC form part of the respondent body on appeal. In Tanzania Breweries Ltd v Serengeti 
Breweries Ltd and Fair Competition Commission,
321
 the FCC objected that it acted as 
adjudicator therefore it was wrongly joined as a respondent on appeal.
322
  
Rule 7(3) of FCTR does not specify who is a respondent in an appeal before the FCT. 
However, the words ‘Commission or relevant regulatory body’ appearing in sub rule 5 which 
is read together with rule 75 (4) to (6) of FCCPR which inter alia provides that, ‘the Director 
of Compliance shall represent the Commission in any appeal…’ connote that the FCC is a 
respondent on appeal before the FCT since is a necessary and statutory party.
323
 The 
justification of this approach is that the FCC has to defend its decision even though it may 
have granted a non-referral notice to the complainant.  
Complications are brought about by the setting out of the FCA that vested the FCC 
with both investigation/complainant and adjudication powers. It is unfair to join the FCC as a 
respondent on appeal when it has withdraw itself as a complainant. In SA, when the CC 
issues a notice of non-referral, it withdraws itself from the entire proceedings and may not 
form part of the respondents on appeal.
324
 However, it is fair and common to join the FCC as 
a respondent on appeal when it has acted as an adjudicator. In SA, the CT which is purely an 
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In SA although the CT hears appeals from the decision of the CC,
326
 on specific 
matters which the CC has power to determine, it is the court (body) of first instance hence 
appeals of its decisions which are final and not consent orders
327
 go to the CAC.
328
 The CAC 
is ‘a court with similar status to that of the High Court’ and composed of at least three judges 
of the High Court who serve on a full time basis.
329
 
In Tanzania an appeal suspends or stays execution of the FCC’s order 
automatically.
330
 In SA, however, the approach is that the suspension of execution may only 
be granted on application.
331
  
The CAC has original jurisdiction on actions of the CC or CT and any Constitutional 
matter arising out of the Act.
332
 Conversely, the FCT has no similar jurisdiction on the above 
issues. Furthermore, the CAC has review jurisdiction which is available where the right to 
appeal is exhausted.
333
 The decision of the FCT, however, is final which is contrary to the due 
process of the law.
334
 The Constitution of Tanzania is supreme and any law which is 
inconsistent is subject to be declared null by a competent court.
335
 
The decision of the CAC is appealable to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) or to 
the Constitutional Court for a Constitutional matter. Such an appeal is subject to the leave of 
the CAC, SCA or Constitutional Court.
336
 This is different from the decision of the FCT 
which is final. (See chapter three above).  
4.5 Conclusion 
From the above analysis of the powers granted to the respective enforcement bodies and their 
procedures, it is obvious that the South African Competition regime is better off as it has 
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managed to separate investigation and prosecution functions from those of adjudication, as 
opposed to Tanzania. This dissertation does not suggest that the competition regime of South 
Africa is free from drawbacks; rather it is better as compared to Tanzanian competition law 
and its procedures.  
The South African enforcement bodies are also divided into two forks. There are the 
quasi judicial bodies (CC and CT) and normal court structure. Appeals from the CT go to the 
CAC which is a division of the High Court, and from there the normal hierarchy of appeal 
that is to the SCA and Constitutional Court for specific matters may take place. These 
resources and facilities are available in Tanzania but the FCA deprives these courts of their 



















GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 General conclusions 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question whether the provisions of the FCA that 
concentrate investigation and adjudication powers in the FCC and further vest the FCT with a 
final appellate jurisdiction with regards to competition disputes, breach the right to a fair trial 
and limits access to justice and are therefore unconstitutional. It determines whether there is a 
need for amendment. 
Generally, the two regulatory authorities, namely FCC and FCT established by the 
FCA in Tanzania to regulate competition law are commendable since they are specialised 
bodies in competition matters, notwithstanding some problematic areas identified by the 
research that calls for amendment.  
The provisions of the FCA that concentrate investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication powers in the FCC and further make final the decisions of the FCT are open to 
criticism as evidenced in the TCC and TBL cases. The arguments levelled by the appellant in 
the TCC case are relevant since they advocate the general principles of fair hearing as 
enshrined by the Constitution.  
The conduct of the chairman and DG of the FCC in participating in investigation of 
alleged anti-competitive practice and thereafter sitting for adjudication undermines the 
principle of natural justice. The practical challenges shown in the TCC case require a 
substantial review to remove the contradiction between the Constitution and the FCA. The 
FCC is facing difficulties in enforcing competition law because of the nature of its functions 
conferred on it by the FCA, which is open to challenge on its partiality. This therefore 
warrants amendment as a means to eliminate the challenges noted. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Jamaica in the JSE case which is persuasive in 
Tanzania revealed that the provisions of competition law that concentrate the powers on one 
body is not only unconstitutional, but also breaches the general principles of natural justice 
and is therefore void. The Constitution of Jamaica has similar wording to that of Tanzania 
which emphasizes the impartiality of the decision-maker. 
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The Jamaican and South African competition laws also show that courts are best 
positioned to hold final appellate jurisdiction in the dispensation of justice. The Supreme 
Court of South Africa in Nation Union of Metalworkers of SA and others
337
 rightly argued 
that ‘the Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal vested with the powers to decide any 
appeal,’ thus the Constitution does not give the legislature powers to vest a specialist tribunal 
with final appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Constitution of Tanzania provides for a 
general right to appeal but the FCA ought to provide for specific provision for appeal to the 
ordinary courts and the procedure thereof.
338
 With that premise, the provision of the FCA that 
gives the FCT the final appellate jurisdiction needs to be reviewed. 
A comparative study on South Africa has thus revealed that it is possible to separate 
investigation from adjudication powers and build a bridge between specialised tribunals and 
the ordinary courts. The study does not intend to transplant the South African competition 
regime into the Tanzanian system, but the legislature is bound to adopt the general principles 
of natural justice since Tanzania domesticated international conventions that advocate for a 
fair trial and the right to access justice. The dissertation, therefore, concludes that the 
structure of the institutional framework and its roles has to be overhauled to open a road to 
justice from the quasi-judicial bodies to the judicial bodies, as recommended below. 
5.2 Recommendations  
The following recommendations are suggested based on the findings of the dissertation. It is 
my opinion that if they are utilized, the problem areas in the provisions of the FCA may be 
reformed by the legislature in order to enhance fair hearing. 
5.2.1 Recommendation for FCC 
This dissertation noted that ss 69 and 71 of the FCA, and rules 12 and 18 of FCCPR give 
powers to the FCC to be an investigator, complainant and adjudicator of the alleged anti-
competitive practices. Section 71 and rule 10 of the FCCPR further indicate that the 
Chairman and DG participate in investigation and adjudication of the same matter. In order to 
remove bias, this dissertation recommends that the FCC retains the powers of investigation, 
while the FCT handles adjudication. 
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The UNCTAD report also recommends (page 83) that there is a need to have a visible 
separation of the triple roles of the DG (investigation, prosecution and adjudication) for the 
DG cannot be an investigator and adjudicator in the same case. This dissertation recommends 
that not only the role of the DG needs to be re-defined but also the role of the chairman. The 
way forward is to re-structure the FCC by appointing the current Director of Compliance as 
the chairman of the FCC. The two departments of investigation and enforcement should 
continue to be under the Director of Compliance as they have necessary experience to 
investigate anti-competitive practices. So, the dissertation not only recommends the 
separation of roles of DG and chairman of the FCC but also the manner of separating these 
roles. Both the chairman and DG might be posted to a new post as recommended below. 
5.2.2 Recommendation for FCT 
In Tanzania the remedy of appeal is only available where there is a statute that provided for it, 
this is according to the Supreme Court of Tanzania in Athumani’s case cited above. In terms 
of ss 61 and 84 of the FCA there is no appeal from the FCT to the ordinary courts. The 
UNCTAD report at page 84 recommended an appeal mechanism against the decision of the 
FCT. This dissertation seconds this recommendation and adds the manner and details of 
getting that mechanism and generally re-structuring the competition authorities. It 
recommends as follows:    
i) The substantial amendment to be made to make the FCT the court of first instance like 
the CT in SA because it is a neutral body which does not play a part in investigation. 
The FCC therefore, after investigation, will refer the dispute to it for adjudication. 
ii)  Further, the current chairman of the FCC to be appointed as a chairman of the FCT, 
and the DG as a deputy chairman. Both of them have sufficient experience to 
adjudicate competition disputes and their neutrality will not affect their independence. 
(A transition period is further recommended.) 
iii) Sections 61 and 84 of the FCA to be amended to allow appeals from the FCT to the 
ordinary courts as recommended herein below.  
5.2.3 Recommendation for linking administrative bodies with judicial bodies 
The dissertation further recommends that an amendment of ss 61 and 84 go hand in hand with 
amendment of rules of the FCTR governing appeals from the FCT and the High Court 
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COURT OF APPEAL OF 
TANZANIA 
Appeal on point of law 
HOGH COURT –
COMMERCIAL DIVISION 
Appellate jurisdiction in competition 
disputes and other commercial disputes 
FAIR COMPETITION 
TRIBUNAL 
Adjudication of anti-competitive 
practices and appeals from the decisions 
of the FCC on matters that the FCC has 
power to make decisions 
FAIR COMPETITION 
COMMISSION 
Investigation of anti-competitive practices 
and related competition issues 
Registry Rules 1999 so as to allow appeal from the FCT to the High Court of Tanzania 
Commercial Division, as in SA where the appeal from the CT goes to CAC. 
The High Court-Commercial Division is well experienced in commercial dispute and 
well-staffed (it has several judges and registrar) and therefore is a division suitable to hear 
appeals from the FCT because competition disputes fall under the category of commercial 
disputes. It is further suggested that the current chairman of the FCT who is a judge of the 
High Court and who serves on a part-time basis in the FCT be posted to this division of the 
High Court to strengthen the panel. Furthermore, the appeal from this court on points of law 
may be referred to Court of Appeal of Tanzania. Below is a proposed structure of competition 
authorities. 
FIGURE 3 THE PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE THAT LINKS WITH 












The re-structuring of the FCC and the FCT and linking them with the High Court-
Commercial Division will help to draw a link between the quasi-judicial bodies and judicial 
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 have opened this link and function well.  
5.2.4 Other recommendations 
The dissertation also noted that there is no provision for consent orders in the FCA which 
may assist the authority to make consented judgement. A consent order helps the competition 
authority to speed up its proceedings in the situation where the respondent admits the 
allegations. I recommend the reform of the FCA to incorporate this provision. In SA where 
the respondent agrees with the investigation of the CC, the consent order is made and the CT 
has no duty to hear evidence on that matter but rather confirms the consented agreement.
343
 
Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the FCA introduced ‘intention’ or ‘negligence’ as statutory 
requirement for establishment of anti-competitive practices. Its implication is that a person 
may be found to have contravened the law only if its intention or negligence is established. 
The FCC has search and seizure powers. In the exercise of these powers, it has a duty to 
establish that a person has breached the FCA, but also it has to establish that such a person 
has breached the FCA intentionally or negligently. The main problem lies in ‘per se 
prohibition’ provided under s 9 of the FCA which prohibits cartel cases irrespective of their 
effect on competition.  
Also, intention is not a prerequisite condition in abuse of dominance in other 
jurisdiction like SA.
344
 The FCC admits that the intention or negligence is a hindrance in 
enforcement of anti-competitive practices and in Serengeti’s case
345
 it breached this statutory 
requirement when it held the TBL liable for abuse of dominance without establishing its 
intention. This dissertation recommends that intention/negligence be removed as a 
prerequisite condition to establish anti-competitive practices. It is enough to establish that a 
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conduct of a person breaches the FCA whether such conduct was done intentionally or 
unintentionally. 
In terms of s 60 (3) of the FCA where a firm is found liable the director, manager or 
an officer of that firm may also be liable. This provision however does not provide the 
manner of punishing these staff members. In Serengeti’s case, the FCC found TBL liable and 
punished it but the issues of liability of its director and manager was not addressed. S 73A of 
SA Act as amended by Act No 1 of 2009 introduces the criminal sanction to any person in the 
management of a firm who causes it to engage in prohibited practices, particularly per se 
prohibition. The UNCTAD report on page 83 recommended criminal sanctions against 
individuals employees of the firm who engaged in cartel activities. In this regard, the 
dissertation recommends amendment of s 60 (3) of the FCA to impose criminal sanction for 
directors and managers of the firm who cause a firm to engage in a prohibited practice in 
terms of s 9 of the FCA. For other petty violation a lenient punishment should be imposed 
such as a pecuniary fine so as not discourage investors who are vital to the economy’s 
growth. 
Lastly, regular training programmes for the FCC, the FCT and judges of the High 
Court-Commercial Division are recommended to familiarise them with the manner of 
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